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LAPSING OF TESTAMENTARY GIFTS, ANTILAPSE
STATUTES, AND THE EXPANSION OF UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE ANTILAPSE PROTECTION*
An implied assumption of the law of wills is that in order for
an intended beneficiary to take under a will, that beneficiary
must survive the testator.' When a testator makes a devise2 to
a devisee who has predeceased the testator, and the testator has
not provided for a substitute taker, the devise lapses.3 At com-
mon law, a lapsed devise was distributed among the residuary
legatees or became intestate property.4 If the residuary devise
lapsed or there was no residuary clause, the property would be
distributed through intestacy.5 Beginning in the late eighteenth
century, legislatures in the United States and in Great Britain
began to counter this harsh result by crafting statutes that
would protect certain devises from lapsing.5  These statutes,
commonly referred to as "antilapse" statutes, provide that when
* Professor John E. Donaldson provided invaluable and greatly appreciated
assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 34.6 (1985).
2. For the purposes of this Note, the term "devise" refers to testamentary gifts of
real property as well as personal property, and "devisee" refers to the intended taker
of a testamentary gift. The distinction between devises (testamentary gifts of realty)
on the one hand and bequests and legacies (testamentary gifts of personalty) on the
other does not generally influence the application of antilapse statutes.
3. See generally THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 140
(2d ed. 1953).
4. Id. at 777. Before the English Statute of Wills of 1837 (and similar statutes in
the United States) testamentary gifts of real property were not ambulatory: a testa-
tor could only devise land that he owned at the time of the execution of the will.
Id. § 4, at 21-22. Any land that the testator acquired after the execution of the will
would be distributed via intestacy unless the testator executed a new will or codicil
to the original will. Id § 91, at 470. The residuary clause of the will applied only to
personalty. Accordingly, if the testator made a devise of real property to a devisee
who predeceased him, the residuary clause of the will could not be used to distrib-
ute the devise and the testator was deemed intestate as to that real property. Id.
§ 140, at 785.
5. Id. § 140, at 784. The reason for this result is a consequence of the theory of
the law of wills. See also infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
269
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
a devisee within a particular class predeceases the testator, the
devise does not fall into the residue or pass to the testator's
heirs by intestacy but descends to the issue of the predeceased
devisee.7
Both the common law rule of lapse and modern antilapse stat-
utes are methods of disposing of a testator's property at the hap-
pening of an event that the testator failed to consider.8 For ex-
ample, assuming that testators generally believe that their chil-
dren will survive them, many testators will not provide for the
possibility that a devisee-child will not survive. When a court
confronts a situation in which a devisee has predeceased the
testator, it must determine who should receive the gift. The
common law rule, which gives lapsed testamentary gifts to the
residuary or intestate takers, results from the evidentiary re-
quirements of the law of wills9 and is completely neutral on the
issue of actual or presumed testamentary intent. In contrast,
antilapse statutes represent a legislative effort to implement the
presumed intent of the testator when the testamentary direc-
tions are frustrated by conditions that the testator did not con-
sider-namely, the death of a devisee.
Aside from Louisiana, which follows the civil law, all states in
the United States now have some form of antilapse provision.'0
These legislative efforts seek to effect presumed testamentary
intent by implementing what a "typical" testator is believed to
have desired. For example, suppose that T (testator) devises
"Blackacre to my child Ann-residuary to my friend Bill," and
Ann predeceases the testator leaving her surviving son, Xavier.
Under the common law, the devise to the predeceased child Ann
would lapse, and Bill would receive Blackacre. The common law
result would leave T's grandchild Xavier with nothing. Under
the theory of antilapse legislation, T (being a typical testator)
would have desired to avoid this result and provide for Xavier.
In practice, almost all current antilapse statutes provide that
the devise to Ann would descend directly to Xavier."
7. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140.
8. Patricia J. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37
EMORY L.J. 323, 347 (1988).
9. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
10. See infra app. A.
11. See infra app. A. This result would not obtain, however, if T manifested an
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In cases that are similar to the above example, the antilapse
result probably effects testamentary intent more frequently than
does the common law rule. The argument in favor of antilapse
provisions is even stronger when a testator has devised the
residuary to charity, assuming that the typical testator would
probably desire that his family members be provided for before
the charity. Statutory will construction methods that tend to
implement actual testamentary intent correctly are, of course,
laudable. Individual antilapse statutes, however, are commonly
the target of criticism because many testamentary schemes are
much more complex than the above example, and antilapse
statutes frequently result in testamentary distributions which
are contrary to obvious testamentary intent. 12
Antilapse statutes also have been criticized for being too rigid
and simplistic, and commentators suggest a variety of ways that
these statutes should be modified. 3 Additionally, the antilapse
statutes in effect across the United States vary significantly. In
fact, there is so much variation that no typical or "majority"
antilapse statute exists. The differences among antilapse stat-
utes reflect the difficulty that legislatures encounter in defining
presumed testamentary intent across a broad spectrum of testa-
tors. This difficulty is exacerbated further by the complexity of
probate law generally. 4
When the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) first was drafted in
1969, it included an antilapse statute that has features similar
to those of many of the antilapse provisions in force today. 5
Article II of the UPC was revised in 1990, and with that revi-
sion, the drafters made significant changes to the antilapse
statute. The revised statute was designed partly to correct some
of the problems identified with antilapse statutes" and partly
to extend antilapse protection to areas which no antilapse stat-
intention that the antilapse statute should not operate. See infra notes 97-100 and
accompanying text.
12. See cases cited infra notes 56, 62-63, 66, 69-70.
13. See generally Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt Instruments: A
Blueprint for Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1985).
14. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
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ute now covers.17 Thus far, there has been little scholarly com-
mentary concerning the new statute beyond that regarding the
statute's treatment of survivorship language. 8
The purpose of this Note is to explore the theory of antilapse,
explain the application of the antilapse statutes that are cur-
rently in effect, and discuss the problems that some of these
antilapse statutes present. This Note will then discuss the 1990
UPC's revised antilapse statute and the goals of the diafters of
that revision. Finally, this Note will examine how well the 1990
UPC antilapse statute deals with the problems that current
antilapse statutes present.
The latest UPC revisions include some ill-advised changes to
the antilapse statute. The UPC antilapse statute now treats a
number of testamentary gifts in a questionable manner. Addi-
tionally, the UPC antilapse statute is unnecessarily confusing
and invites increased litigation.
OPERATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANTILAPSE
History and Development
Lapse, according to the technical definition of the term, occurs
only when the intended beneficiary of a devise is competent to
take under the terms of the will at execution but dies or other-
wise loses the capacity to take the property before the death of
the testator. 9 Technically, failed class gifts, void testamentary
gifts," and gifts that are renounced by the intended beneficiary
have not lapsed.2' The distinction between lapsed devises, re-
nounced devises, and devises that are void has been blurred
17. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better,
or More Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1993); Martin D.
Begleiter, Article 1I of the Uniform Probate Code and the Malpractice Revolution, 59
TENN. L. REv. 101 (1991). "Survivorship language" refers to the language in a de-
vise, such as "to X, if he survives me," intended to prevent application of an anti-
lapse statute.
19. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140.
20. A void gift arises when the testator devises property to one who is dead or





somewhat by courts and legislatures.2 Under most antilapse
statutes, whether a devise has truly lapsed, become void, or
been renounced is not considered a factor in the operation of the
statute.23 However, there are some statutes that, either ex-
pressly or through judicial interpretation, do not cover some void
gifts. For the purposes of this discussion, these distinctions
generally will be ignored, but it is important to recognize that in
some jurisdictions and under certain circumstances the various
types of failed devises will be treated differently.
The term "antilapse" is a misnomer because antilapse statutes
do not prevent lapse, they simply redirect a lapsed testamentary
gift by providing substitute takers.2 6 Generally, certain lapsed
gifts, which at common law would fall into the residue or pass
by intestacy, are given instead to the issue of the predeceased
devisee." Not all lapsed devises, however, are covered by anti-
lapse statutes; many lapsed gifts still are subject to the common
law rule.2' Furthermore, antilapse statutes are rules of con-
struction that do not operate if the testator manifests an inten-
tion within the will that the statute not apply.
Because there are significant variations among the antilapse
statutes in effect in the United States,0 it is difficult to explain
adequately the application of antilapse statutes without first
exploring their development.
The common law rule, under which all lapsed devises fell into
the residue or passed by intestacy, engendered dissatisfaction
because it often seemed to defeat the probable intent of testators
who had failed to adequately provide for the possibility that a
devisee would predecease the source.3 Accordingly, legislatures
22. WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, 6 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS §
50.1. (W.H. Anderson, 1962 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS]; see also
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-801(d)(1) (1990) (treating one who has renounced a devise as
having predeceased the testator).
23. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140.
24. See infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
26. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 cmt.
27. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.10.
28. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140.
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 40-72 and accompanying text.
31. See French, supra note 13, at 337 nn. 11, 13 (quoting extensively from ENG-
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began enacting statutes that modified or abrogated the common
law rule."
The first antilapse statute was enacted in Massachusetts in
1783. 3' This statute applied to devises to relatives of the testa-
tor and provided that if the devisee-relative predeceased the
testator, the devise would pass to the surviving issue of that
relative.34
In 1810, Maryland adopted an antilapse statute35 that dif-
fered from the Massachusetts provision in two ways. First,
Maryland's statute applied to all devises regardless of whether
the devisee was related to the testator.36 Second, under this
statute, if a devisee predeceased the testator, the devise would
not pass to the devisee's issue but would be distributed as
though the devisee had died owning the property." In other
LISH COMMISSIONERS ON THE REVISION OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, FOURTH
REPORT 73 (Gr. Br. 1833)).
32. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.10.
33. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 22 (West 1990) (Historical and Statu-
tory Notes). The 1783 statute, originally codified at St. 1783, c. 24, § 8, provided:
If a devise or legacy is made to a child or other relation of the testator,
who dies before the testator, but leaves issue surviving the testator, such
issue shall, unless a different disposition is made or required by the will,
take the same estate which the person whose issue they are would have
taken if he had survived the testator.
Id.
This statute has since been amended and now includes adoptive children under
the definitions of the terms "child or other relation" and "issue"; the statute also
now includes devises under a class gift "whether the death occurred before or after
the execution of the will." Id.
34. Id.
35. Simpson v. Piscano, 419 A.2d 1059, 1065 (Md. 1980) (Cole, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Chapter 34, § 4, Laws of Maryland of 1810). The Maryland statute provided:
That from and after the passage of this act, no devise, legacy or bequest,
shall lapse or fail of taking effect by reason of the death of any devisee
or legatee named in any last will or testament, or any codicil thereto, in
the life-time of the testator, but every such devise, legacy or bequest,
shall have the same effect and operation in law to transfer the right,
estate and interest, in the property mentioned in such devise or bequest
as if such devisee or legatee had survived the testator.
Id. at n.4 (quoting Chapter 34, § 4, Laws of Maryland of 1810).
This statute has been updated, but the meaning of the statute has remained rel-
atively constant. See MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (1991).
36. MD. EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403.
37. Id.
274
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words, if the devisee died testate, the lapsed devise would be
distributed under the terms of the deceased devisee's will. If the
devisee died intestate, the property would descend to the
devisee's surviving heirs who may or may not be issue.
The English Statute of Wills of 1837 contained an antilapse
provision that limited its coverage to devises to children or other
issue of the testator and, like the Maryland statute, distributed
the lapsed devise as though the devisee had died owning the
property."
These antilapse statutes from the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries serve as the model for all antilapse stat-
utes in effect today. 9 For example, nine states and the District
of Columbia follow the Maryland example of applying antilapse
to all devises.4" Conversely, four states limit the application of
their antilapse statutes to devises to the issue of the testator in
the same manner as the English Statute of Wills.4 ' The re-
mainder of the states' antilapse statutes cover devises to
devisees who are, to a defined degree, related to the testator.42
38. Wills Act 7 WM. IV & 1 VICT. CAP. 26, § 33 (1837), reprinted in ALISON
REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
OF WILLS: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 220 (1928).
The Wills Act provided:
That where any Person being a Child or other Issue of the Testator to
whom any Real or Personal Estate shall be devised or bequeathed for
any Estate or Interest not determinable at or before the Death of such
Person shall die in the Lifetime of the Testator leaving Issue, and any
such Issue of such Person shall be living at the Time of the Death of the
Testator, such Devise or Bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as
if the Death of such Person had happened immediately after the Death
of the Testator, unless a contrary Intention shall appear by the Will.
Id.
39. French, supra note 13, at 339.
40. D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-308 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-103 (1982); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.273 (West 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.400 (MichielBobbs-
Merrill 1984); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 551:12 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-6-19 (1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-105 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-3 (Michie 1982).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 5/4-11
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1 (Burns 1981) (including parents of
the testator); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-7 (1972).
42. Several states' antilapse statutes apply to devises to a descendant of the
testator's parents. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-411 (West 1993) (Connecticut
excludes devises to the issue of the testator's siblings); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
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The statutes that limit the application of antilapse to devises to
relatives or kin of the testator almost universally exclude devis-
es to the testator's spouse under the rationale that the typical
testator would favor the residuary takers over the spouse's chil-
dren from a former marriage. 3
Current antilapse statutes also vary in other ways. Thirty-
four states expressly include devises that are drafted in the form
of a class gift,44 and fifteen states and the District of Columbia
LAW § 3-3.3 (Consol. 1979); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (1975); TEx. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 68 (West 1980). Michigan extends antilapse coverage to descendants of
the testator's grandparents. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.134 (West 1980). Many
states further broaden the coverage to apply to the testator's grandparents as well
as their descendants. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-224 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.240
(1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2605 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-605
(West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2313 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.603
(West 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-605 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-605 (1979);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-605 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-605 (West
1975); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-613 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-35 (West 1983);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-603 (Michie 1978) (including devises to step-children); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-05 (2-605) (1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64.1 (Michie 1991);
WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1977). Other states extend antilapse application to still fur-
ther removed relatives. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (covering
the testator's great-grandparents and descendants of the great-grandparents); KAN.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-602 (Vernon 1983) (covering the testator's spouse or any rela-
tives within the sixth degree); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-605 (1993) (covering all pos-
sible heirs of the testator).
The remaining states' antilapse statutes apply to devises to either blood rela-
tives or kindred of the testator. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West 1991) (including
devises to kindred of the testator's spouse); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 22
(1990); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.460 (Vernon 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2343 (1989);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.200 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Baldwin 1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 142 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.395 (1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-6-8 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 558 (1989); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.110 (West 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.27 (West 1991).
43. French, supra note 13, at 357-58.
44. ALA. CODE § 43-8-224 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.240 (1985); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2605 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104 (1987); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6147 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-605 (West 1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 2313 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.603 (West 1976); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-605 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-605 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, %
5/4-11 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273 (West 1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 394.400 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-605
(1964); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
191, § 22 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.134 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.2-605 (West 1975); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-613 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
2343 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-35 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-603
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do not mention whether class gifts are covered by the statute.5
The antilapse statutes that expressly include class gifts also dif-
fer. Four states' statutes save lapsed devises to deceased class
members only if the class member died after execution of the
will and do not apply antilapse to void class gifts. 46 In states
where the antilapse statute fails to mention class gifts, courts
generally hold that class gifts are included under the antilapse
statute47 but differ as to whether the statutes cover void class
gifts.48
Almost all antilapse statutes provide that if the deceased devi-
see has surviving issue and is within the class of devisees cov-
ered by the statute, then the devise will pass to such issue.49
Only Maryland retains its rule of distributing lapsed devises to
"those persons who would have taken the property if the legatee
had died, testate or intestate, owning the property."0
(Michie 1978); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3 (Consol. 1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31-42 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-05 (2-605) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. §
112.395 (1990); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-
603 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-105 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
2-605 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64.1 (Michie 1991); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-3
(Michie 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.27 (West 1991); WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1977).
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-411 West 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-308
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-103 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1 (Burns 1981);
KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-602 (Vernon 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-7 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.460 (Vernon 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.200 (1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:12 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Baldwin 1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 142 (West 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-6-19 (1984); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-6-8 (1984); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (West 1980); VT.
STAT. ANN tit. 14, § 558 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.110 (1987).
46. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West 1991); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
3-3.3 (Consol. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.395 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.27
(West 1991). A void class gift arises when the testator creates a class gift (e.g., "to
my children") and one of the class members has died prior to the execution of the
will. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., In re Steidl's Estate, 201 P.2d 58 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (case
decided before California added express language to antilapse statute covering class
gifts); Everhard v. Brown, 62 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945); Hoverstad v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 N.W.2d 48 (S.D. 1955); Burch v. McMillin, 15 S.W.2d 86
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929). But see In re Estate of Kalouse, 282 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1979)
(holding that antilapse statute does not cover class gifts); In re Estate of Zagar, 491
N.W.2d 915 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that antilapse statute should only apply
to class gifts if all of the class members predecease the testator).
48. Roberts, supra note 8, at 344-46.
49. Id. at 336-37; see also infra app. A.
50. MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS, § 4-403 (1991). Out of necessity, this provi-
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Two states have adopted certain aspects of the Maryland
method for determining takers of a lapsed devise. Georgia's
statute distributes lapsed devises to the predeceased devisee's
issue, but in the same proportions as if the property were inher-
ited directly from their deceased testate or intestate ancestor. 5'
One apparent rationale underlying this rule is that a child of the
deceased devisee who has been disinherited by the devisee
should not be allowed to take property by virtue of an antilapse
statute. In contrast, Iowa distributes lapsed devises to the heirs
of the predeceased devisee.52
Two states provide that lapsed devises pass to the issue of the
predeceased devisee only under certain circumstances.
Pennsylvania's statute substitutes the deceased devisee's issue
only if the testator's spouse or children would not take by virtue
of the residuary clause or by intestacy. 3 North Carolina takes
a similar approach, allowing a lapsed devise to pass to the issue
of the predeceased devisee only if such issue would have been an
heir of the testator if the testator had died intestate. 4
Coverage of Current Antilapse Statutes
The most important feature of any antilapse statute is the
class of devises covered by the statute.55 This feature not only
determines how frequently an antilapse statute will apply, but it
also influences the level of impact that an antilapse statute will
have on the distribution of an estate. In other words, an anti-
lapse statute that applies only to devises to the testator's issue
(1) will not affect as many devises and (2) will not change the
sion of the Maryland statute has been limited somewhat by the courts. For example,
if T devised property to predeceased devisee A, and A's will devised "everything I
own to B," and B predeceased A, the lapsed devise would not be distributed by the
terms of B's will but would pass under the common law rule to the residuary takers
in T's will. See Simpson v. Piscano, 419 A.2d 1059 (Md. 1980) and cases cited there-
in.
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-103 (1982).
52. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273 (West 1992). An advantage of Iowa's method over
that of Georgia is that the deceased devisee's will, which may contain lapsed devises
of its own, need not be reinterpreted.
53. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (1975).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 (1993).
55. French, supra note 13, at 344.
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common law result in a significant manner because the
testator's remote issue probably would have taken at least some
of the lapsed devise through intestacy. An antilapse statute that
applies to all devises without regard to the devisee's relationship
to the testator would be applied more frequently and would tend
to impact the scheme of testamentary distribution more signifi-
cantly.
Whether limiting the coverage of antilapse statutes to devises
to issue of the testator is necessarily better than either extend-
ing antilapse protection to all devises or to devises to all rela-
tives is impossible to determine. Most testators probably would
prefer to provide for their own children over the children of a
deceased friend. It is possible, however, that the majority of
testators that devise only nominal amounts to their friends
would prefer that their friends' children benefit from such a
small gift. When testators make large devises to their friends,
they may either prefer that their own children take small
amounts or intend to disinherit their children altogether.
No matter which devises an antilapse statute covers, the stat-
ute sometimes will lead to results that are contrary to probable
testamentary intent. Where antilapse protection is limited to
devises to the testator's children, cases arise where disinherited
children take property devised to a predeceased sibling. For ex-
ample, in a Texas case, Najvar v. Vasek,56 the testator devised
all of his real estate to his brother, Bohumil, and "his heirs and
assigns in fee simple forever."57 The will went on to state, "[i]t
being my wish however for my beloved brother to keep the prop-
erty for his son [A]lvin."58 Bohumil predeceased the testator.59
The record at trial established that (1) the testator was survived
by three children whom he had not seen for approximately 40
years; (2) the testator had left each of his three children one
dollar in his will; (3) the children were unable to recognize the
testator; and (4) the testator had an extremely close relationship
with his nephew Alvin.6" The court, reversing a finding in favor
56. 564 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 207.
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of Alvin's children,61 held that the Texas antilapse statute,
which at that time only covered devises to children or other de-
scendants of the testator, did not apply to the devise to the
testator's brother.62
At the other extreme are the antilapse statutes that cover all
devises. These statutes are just as likely to lead to results that
are contrary to testamentary intent. For example, in Persson v.
Dukes,63 a married couple executed "sweetheart" wills leaving
everything to each other.64 The husband predeceased his wife
by less than two hours.65 Because the husband died first, his
property became vested in his wife, and when the wife died, all
of her property, which she had devised to her predeceased hus-
band, was distributed to her husband's heirs under the antilapse
statute; her family took nothing.66 In this case, the order of
deaths determined the distributions, and actual intent was
seemingly defeated.
The compromise between limiting the coverage of an antilapse
statute to devises to the testator's issue or extending coverage to
all devises is to extend coverage of the statute to some class of
relatives of the testator.6 1 Under this type of antilapse provi-
sion, both Najvar and Persson would have resulted in distribu-
tions that were consistent with testamentary intent. Most states
favor this approach," and it probably effects testamentary in-
tent more frequently than the other two methods. However,
61. Alvin died after the testator but before final resolution of the case. Id. at 205.
62. Id. at 208. This decision, in part, motivated the Texas legislature to change
its antilapse statute in 1991 to include devises to any descendant of the testator's
parents. See Annotations, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (West Supp. 1991); see also In
re Estate of Connolly, 222 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. 1974) (upholding application of anti-
lapse statute that frustrated testator's probable intent).
63. 372 A.2d 240 (Md. 1977).
64. Id. at 241 n.1.
65. Id. at 241.
66. Id. at 243; f. Robinson v. Ray, 327 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. 1985) (holding that where
testator devises estate to predeceased wife, estate passes to wife's son from a prior
marriage and testator's relatives take nothing); Stewart v. Whitehurst, 303 A.2d 393
(Md. 1973) (holding that where testator devises estate to predeceased wife, estate
passes to wife's parents and testator's father takes nothing).
67. For example, a statute could limit antilapse protection to devises to the
testator's grandparents and the descendants of those grandparents. See supra note
42 (identifying those states that have adopted this type of compromise).
68. See supra note 42.
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there are examples where such statutes have caused results that
the testator clearly would not have endorsed because the cover-
age is either too narrow 9 or too broad. °
One may conclude from this discussion that, even though the
coverage of an antilapse statute is its most distinguishing char-
acteristic, the problems with antilapse statutes are not a result
of the class of devises they cover. Rather, the problems generat-
ed by antilapse statutes are a consequence of the nature of anti-
lapse theory and the law of wills generally.
THE NATURE OF THE LAW OF WILLS: ANTILAPSE THEORY AND
CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS
The Varying Methods of Antilapse
All of the different types of antilapse statutes reflect attempts
on the part of legislatures to effect presumed testamentary in-
tent more precisely. Given the contradictory assumptions under-
lying antilapse statutes, no consensus exists regarding what the
typical testator would want to happen with a particular lapsed
devise. Each method of antilapse has advantages and disadvan-
tages, and for every antilapse statute, one could pose hypo-
thetical situations that advance or thwart presumed testamenta-
ry intent. In drafting an antilapse statute, legislatures must
predict which hypothetical situation more likely will occur.
For example, suppose that a testator devises property to a
devoted employee, and the employee predeceases the testator.
Would that testator prefer to provide for that employee's chil-
dren? The answer depends upon a variety of factors, including
69. See Estate of Connolly, 222 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. 1974) (refusing to save lapsed
gift to testator's predeceased friend for friend's daughter who was also a beneficiary
under the will and allowing testator's various collateral relatives to take property in
spite of the fact that testator had not seen the relatives for at least fourteen years
and had stated her intention not to leave anything to her relatives); French, supra
note 13, at 359-60 & n.122 (citing Connolly, In re Estate of Hittel, 75 P. 53 (Cal.
1903), and In re Estate of Sessions, 153 P. 231 (Cal. 1915)).
70. See In re Estate of Ulrikson, 290 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1980) (applying antilapse
statute to save lapsed devise to testator's predeceased brother for the brother's chil-
dren and excluding testator's other nieces and nephews in spite of testamentary
scheme which arguably indicated that testator would have preferred that all nieces
and nephews be treated equally).
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the size of the devise, the testator's reason for making the de-
vise, and the provisions that the testator has made for his own
family. The testator may have intended the gift to enable the
employee to finance a child's education. Conversely, the gift
simply may have been a reward for past performance, and the
testator intended the gift to lapse if the employee is not around
to enjoy it. As a practical matter, it would be impossible to draft
a statute that takes all of these considerations into account. As a
result, legislatures try to determine which devises to employees
(or friends, distant relatives, etc.) are of the sort that the typical
testator would intend to pass on to the devisee's children.
Recent empirical studies have attempted to determine what
testators would prefer under given situations.71 However, in
light of the fact that most antilapse statutes do not correspond
to the results of these studies, legislatures probably rely more on
personal experience in crafting their antilapse statutes.72 Legis-
lative reliance on this subjective judgment results in a range of
statutes, each purporting to effect testamentary intent but in
different ways.
Construction Problems Caused by the Simplicity of Antilapse
Statutes
The antilapse provisions in effect today tend to be simple stat-
utes that are designed to correct only the most harsh lapse re-
sults under the common law. For example, all antilapse statutes
will save a devise to a testator's predeceased child with surviv-
ing issue from falling into a residuary gift to a charity.7" These
statutes do not, however, make value judgements determining
that the testator's grandchildren are more worthy than the char-
ity; they simply apply rigid rules that ignore the individual
testator's true intent and presume that the testator would prefer
that his grandchildren take over the charity.
71. French, supra note 13, at 340 n.20 (citing a study which found that majority
of people would prefer to leave their estates to surviving children rather than the
issue of deceased children).
72. Most antilapse statutes would treat the issue of deceased children the same as
surviving children. See infra app. A.
73. See infra app. A.
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The testator can avoid application of the antilapse statute
only by clearly manifesting an intent within the will that the
statute not operate.74 If a predeceased devisee is within the
protected class, neither extrinsic evidence nor a testamentary
scheme that clearly shows that the testator intended for a devise
to lapse can be used to forestall an antilapse statute from pass-
ing the devise to the devisee's issue.7' For example, several cas-
es, such as Estate of Carroll,7" have held that a testator's at-
tempt to disinherit a relative did not adequately establish the
testator's intent that the antilapse statute not operate even
when the statute would pass a lapsed devise to the disinherited
relative.
77
In Carroll, the testator left a holographic will by which she
devised her entire estate to her sister, Margaret, and one dollar
each to the testator's brother and to Margaret's son. v" The tes-
tator further stated that the one dollar gifts were "each Any will
make before is null & void [sic]."" Although the language used
is less than straightforward, clearly the testator did not intend
for her brother or Margaret's son to take anything more than
the one dollar she devised. Nonetheless, the court held that
because Margaret had predeceased the testator, the antilapse
statute must operate, and it passed the gift to Margaret's son. °
The court also refused to admit extrinsic evidence to show that
the testator fully intended to disinherit Margaret's son."'
Antilapse statutes operate in this manner because legislatures
and courts, deferring to the policies of the wills act, disregard
extrinsic evidence of actual testamentary intent. In order for a
74. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140.
75. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.11.
76. 291 P.2d 976 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
77. In re Estate of Roberts, 88 Cal. Rptr. 396, (Ct. App. 1970); In re Murphy's
Estate, 50 P.2d 828 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935); see also Larrabee v. Tracy, 134 P.2d
265 (Cal. 1943) (applying antilapse statute to pass lapsed devise to persons not
named in will despite clause expressly disinheriting those not named therein); Sleep-
er v. Larrabee, 165 N.E. 121 (Mass. 1929) (same). But see In re McKeon's Estate, 46
N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding that disinherited niece could not take by vir-
tue of the antilapse statute).
78. Carroll, 291 P.2d at 977.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 979.
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will to be admitted to probate it must be a properly attested and
signed writing." This standard normally requires at least the
signature of two witnesses in addition to the signature of the
testator. 3 The rationale behind requiring this high evidentiary
standard is that "the best evidence of the testator's intent, the
testator, is always dead."' Furthermore, when a court inter-
prets a will, information beyond the document will not satisfy
this evidentiary standard and cannot be considered by the court
unless an ambiguity is evident in the writing itself.8 5 Absent
such an ambiguity, extrinsic evidence, which may establish that
the testator intended something other than the legal effect of his
words, will not be admitted. 6
As rules of construction, antilapse statutes become a part of
the will." In other words, when the testator devises "Blackacre
to A," an antilapse statute adds the words "or to A's issue if A
does not survive me" unless the testator clearly indicates the
intent that the antilapse statute not apply. In Carroll, discussed
above, the antilapse statute added "or to Margaret's issue" to the
devise to Margaret, and the extrinsic evidence that application
of the antilapse statute violated the testator's testamentary
scheme could not overcome the "appearance" of these words in
the testator's will.
8 8
Accordingly, in order for antilapse statutes to better apply
testamentary intent they need to be more flexible. Legislatures
should contemplate who would take under the application of the
statute and who would take under the common law rule and
make value judgments as to which outcome would better effect
the intent of the typical testator. Only a few antilapse statutes
force courts to apply this type of value judgment. The Pennsyl-
vania statute, for example, passes lapsed devises to the issue of
82. See generally MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF WILLS 42-62 (1898) (explain-
ing the necessary requirements for the execution of a valid will).
83. Id. at 50.
84. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR., ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 6.1 (1988).
85. Id.
86. Id.; cf Royston v. Watts, 842 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining
that when the words of the testator's will do not express an intent to override the
statute, then the matter is not open to extrinsic evidence to show contrary intent).
87. In re Estate of Burns, 100 N.W.2d 399, 402 (S.D. 1960).
88. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
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the devisee only if the wife or children of the testator would not
take under the common law rule.89 This statute acts as a rule
of construction, but its application is limited by a presumption
in favor of the testator's immediate family. This statute does not
go far enough, however, because it operates to give property to
children of the testator whom the testator expressly has disin-
herited.
There are also examples when courts go beyond the -rigid
bounds of the law of wills in order to formulate outcomes that
are more likely to effect the typical testator's true intent. These
courts interpret the antilapse statutes more flexibly. For exam-
ple, some courts have held that when the testator has made
specific devises to the issue of the predeceased devisee, the tes-
tator has sufficiently manifested his intent that the statute not
operate.9 These cases, however, represent the minority, and
the vast majority of states apply antilapse statutes in the more
traditional and inflexible manner.
The simplicity of antilapse statutes also causes a related prob-
lem in that it ignores the complexity of probate law and the
many different types of testamentary transfers that testators
often employ. 1 For example, few statutes mention whether
they apply to powers of appointment,92 options,93 or trusts. 4
89. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (1975).
90. See Williams v. Williams, 9 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1942); Jensen v. Nelson, 19
N.W.2d 596 (Iowa 1945). But see Anderson v. Anderson, 126 N.E.2d 726 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1955).
91. For a thorough discussion of construction problems regarding lapse statutes,
see Roberts, supra note 8.
92. See generally Dow v. Atwood, 260 A.2d 437, 441 (Me. 1969) (explaining that
general powers of appointment are covered by antilapse statute but special powers of
appointment are not).
93. An example of an option is when the testator devises "Blackacre to A if he
gives the estate $10,000, and if he does not give the estate $10,000, then Blackacre
to B." Options are useful in situations where the testator's primary asset is a house
or farm. If the testator does not want to force his children to sell off the house in
order to split the proceeds, he may devise the option to purchase the home to one of
the children and then provide the other children with the proceeds from the sale.
The problem arises where the intended beneficiary of the option predeceases the
testator. Should the option be preserved for the children of the beneficiary? Two
cases have said it should. See In re Estate of Niehenke, 818 P.2d 1324 (Wash.
1991); In re Estate of Passanisi, 476 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
The problem with preserving these options for the issue of the intended benefi-
1994] 285
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Antilapse statutes are often the subject of litigation because the
statutes generally fail to deal completely with commonly utilized
testamentary gifts such as class gifts. The rudimentary nature of
these statutes forces courts to wrestle with inadequate language
to answer the construction problems that cases present. 5 Con-
sequently, courts attach different meaning to identical lan-
guage.96 Much of the confusion and litigation concerning these
issues easily could be avoided if statutes expressly dealt with
them.
Manifesting an Intent That the Statute Not Apply
The most heavily litigated area in antilapse involves the re-
quirement that a testator must clearly indicate an intent that
the antilapse statute not apply in order to prevent its opera-
tion.97 This requirement attaches to all antilapse statutes" to
varying degrees because courts disagree over what language is
adequate to stop the operation of the statute. " All courts agree
that the testator's intent to defeat the statute must be shown
clearly,'00 but exactly what the term "clearly" means is not it-
self particularly clear.
Courts generally accept that a devise that states that the anti-
lapse statute should not be applied (or a clause that states that
the antilapse statute should not apply to any devise) suffices to
defeat the operation of the statute."' Similarly, a clause that
ciary is that in a strict sense, the testator has provided for an alternative devise
that many courts hold clearly manifests an intent that the statute not apply. See
infra note 124 and accompanying text.
94. See generally Portales Nat'l Bank v. Bellin, 645 P.2d 986, 991 (N.M. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that in the case of a devise to a trust, the trustee is a devisee for
purposes of applying the antilapse statute); Keller v. Keller, 287 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va.
1982) (holding that antilapse statute did not cause share of predeceased devisee to
pass to children where that share was held in trust).
95. See generally Roberts, supra note 8.
96. See infra note 130 (citing two cases in the same jurisdiction that reach oppo-
site conclusions on the effect of survivorship language).
97. Roberts, supra note 8, at 346-47.
98. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.11.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 103-30.
100. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.11.
101. Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC's New Survivor-
ship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (1992).
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states that if any devisee predeceases the testator the devise
should either lapse, revert to the estate, or fall into the residue
should suffice to defeat the operation of the antilapse stat-
ute.'0 2 Beyond these obvious manifestations of intent, juris-
dictions disagree as to what is necessary to state contrary intent
"clearly."
Disinheritance as Contrary Intent
No consensus exists regarding whether the express disinheri-
tance of an individual suffices to prevent that individual from
taking by virtue of an antilapse statute.' 3 If the testator states
that a specific person should not take any part of the estate,
apparently the testator has indicated clearly that the antilapse
statute should not operate to pass a lapsed devise to that per-
son. In many jurisdictions, however, courts hold that an express
disinheritance will not stop that person from taking a part of the
estate by virtue of the antilapse statute.0 4
As a general rule, disinheritance by negative implication'
does not prevent persons so disinherited from taking by virtue of
an antilapse statute.0 6 Most courts also hold that when a tes-
tator devises a nominal gift, such as one dollar, to an individual,
102. Id. See generally In re Estate of Evans, 227 N.W.2d 603 (Neb. 1975) (holding
that clause in will that stated that deceased child's share of residuary should go to
the surviving children was sufficient to defeat antilapse statute); In re McFerren's
Estate, 76 A.2d 759 (Pa. 1959) (statement that devises should lapse held to defeat
the antilapse statute).
103. Commentators even disagree as to what the general rule among courts is re-
garding disinherited persons and their ability to take an interest in an estate by
virtue of an antilapse statute. Compare Roberts, supra note 8, at 354 ("Generally,
courts . . . apply the lapse statute despite the express disinheritance.") with C.C.
Marvel, Annotation, Testator's Intention as Defeating Operation of Antilapse Statute,
63 A.L.R.2d 1172, § 8 at 1184 (1959) ("Various results, seemingly difficult or impos-
sible to reconcile in some instances, have been reached in cases in which those enti-
tled to take under the operation of the antilapse statute were apparently expressly
disinherited or bequeathed a nominal amount only.").
104. Roberts, supra note 8, at 354 n.124 (citing In re Pfadenhauer's Estate, 324
P.2d 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963); In re Sullivan's Estate 88 P.2d 225 (Cal. Ct. App.
1939); Murray v. Murray, 564 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1978); Estate of Sellers, 496 A.2d 1237
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
105. E.g., a statement in the will that those not mentioned in the will are not to
share in the estate.
106. Marvel, supra note 103, § 7 at 1184.
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the testator has not clearly stated his intent that the statute not
apply. 107
According to Professor Roberts, part of the rationale of this
outcome is that words of disinheritance are generally form-book
expressions made in order to toll the application of a pretermit-
ted heir statute. 1°8 Some courts also point out that the disin-
heritance is made when the testator believes that the disinher-
ited individual's ancestor would take the devise. 109 Accordingly,
the disinheritance does not mean that the testator intends that
the disinherited individual not take if the ancestor has died.
Furthermore, applying an antilapse statute to allow a disinherit-
ed heir to take a lapsed devise makes sense when viewed in
light of the rule that disinherited heirs cannot be prevented
from taking by intestacy."' As Professor Roberts observes,
however, this argument fails because intestate distributions are
made as a rule of law, and antilapse statutes are rules of con-
struction "that should not apply when there is contrary in-
tent.""'
In a few jurisdictions, words of express disinheritance have
been held to keep the disinherited individual from taking under
the will."2 The arguments in favor of applying an antilapse
statute to pass property to persons expressly disinherited are
weak. Express disinheritance is not done lightly. A clause in a
will stating that an individual is to take nothing is an unequivo-
cal expression of a testator's true intent. Vague possibilities that
the testator made the disinheritance under the belief that the
disinherited individual's ancestor would take the property do not
change the attested words of the will."' Antilapse statutes dis-
107. See, e.g., In re Estate of Roberts, 88 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Ct. App. 1970); In re
Carroll's Estate, 291 P.2d 976 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
108. Roberts, supra note 8, at 354.
109. See, e.g., In re Carroll's Estate, 291 P.2d 976 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Bruner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 443 P.2d 645 (Or. 1968).
110. Roberts, supra note 8, at 356.
111. Id. at 357.
112. E.g., Fischer v. Mills, 85 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1957); In re McKeon's Estate 46
N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
113. Furthermore, when courts apply antilapse statutes, they should attempt to
effect the probable intent of the typical testator. Clearly, the typical testator would
not intend for an expressly disinherited individual to take simply because an unfore-
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tribute property when the testamentary directions are made
impossible by an unforeseen event."4 The death of a devisee
does not render a disinheritance impossible.
Words of Survivorship
The inclusion of words of survivorship with a devise is often
thought to be an effective method of preventing an antilapse
statute from being applied to that devise. For example, many
commentators believe that by devising Blackacre "to A if she
survives me," the testator has clearly indicated an intent con-
trary to the antilapse statute by conditioning the devise on sur-
vival of the devisee."5 The weight of authority in this area is
that attaching a survivorship requirement to a devise sufficient-
ly evidences an intent opposed to the application of the stat-
ute."
6
A significant and perhaps growing number of jurisdictions
ignore this authority and hold that words of survivorship, by
themselves, do not defeat the operation of the statute."7 One
court provided the rationale of this holding by stating that by
making "a conditional devise to [the devisee], 'provided she be
living at the time of my death,' [the testator] was, in fact, ex-
pressing the same intention which the statute provides," namely
that for an individual to take a devise, he must survive the
testator.18 The argument made by this court makes sense. At-
taching words of survivorship to a devise does not really change
seen event has arisen.
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. In re Will of Hanf, 471 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
116. See, e.g., Slattery v. Kelsch, 734 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Halbach
& Waggonner, supra note 101, at 1105. See generally In re Estate of Stroble, 636
P.2d 236 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); In re Will of Robinson, 236 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sup. Ct.
1963); Day v. Brooks, 224 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1967); White v. Moore, 760
S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1988).
117. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 101, at 1105 n.59 (citing Schneller v.
Schneller, 190 N.E. 121 (111. 1934); In re Estate of Bulger, 586 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991); Detzel v. Nieberding, 219 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1966); Estate of
Kehler, 411 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1980); Henderson v. Parker, 728 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1987)).
118. Detzel, 219 N.E.2d at 336. Detzel has never been reversed but was character-
ized as "clearly and completely erroneous" in another Ohio case two years later.
Shalkhauser v. Beach, 233 N.E.2d 527, 530 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1968).
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the nature of the devise-the devisee has to survive in order to
take the gift whether or not the words of survivorship are at-
tached. The survivorship language does not clearly indicate that
the issue of the predeceased devisee should be prevented from
taking the gift.
Conversely, courts and commentators argue that words of
survivorship should prevent the antilapse statute from applying
to the devise.119 Antilapse statutes are crafted to effect the
testator's presumed intent in situations that the testator has
failed to consider. By attaching words of survivorship to a de-
vise, the testator demonstrates consideration of the possibility
that a devisee might die and has done nothing about it-perhaps
intending that the devise fall into the residue if the devisee dies.
Moreover, even though the plain meaning of words of survi-
vorship is not indicative of contrary intent, the legal effect of the
words has been long recognized by courts as manifesting the
testator's intent that the statute not operate. 2 ° Consequently,
many scriveners have relied on these words to prevent the issue
of deceased devisees from taking by virtue of the statute.'21
Changing this rule would result in testamentary distributions
that are clearly contrary to the wishes of many testators.'22
Alternative Devises as Contrary Intent
An oft-repeated rule states that the provision of alternative
takers of a devise in the event that the primary taker dies be-
fore the testator is the surest way of preventing the operation of
an antilapse statute. 23 Sometimes, however, this rule is not
applied.
119. See Shalkhauser, 233 N.E.2d at 527; Ascher, supra note 18, at 651-58;
Begleiter, supra note 18, at 126-27.
120. Ascher, supra note 18, at 651; Begleiter, supra note 18, at 126-27.
121. Begleiter, supra note 18, at 126-27; see also Ascher, supra note 18, at 651;
Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 101, at 1104-05.
122. Ascher, supra note 18, at 651-58.
123. Roberts, supra note 8, at 348-49 ('The clearest way to indicate contrary intent
is to expressly require that the devisee survive T and provide for alternative takers
in the event that the devisee should predecease T."). Actually, the clearest way to
indicate contrary intent is to state expressly that no antilapse statute is to be ap-
plied to the devise. See P.M. Dwyer, Annotation, Intention of Testator as Defeating
Operation of Statute to Prevent Lapses, 92 A.L.R. 846, 851 (1934).
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When a testator devises Blackacre "to A and if A does not
survive me, then to B," it would seem that the testator has indi-
cated clearly that the antilapse statute should not apply. The
testator, however, has not provided expressly for the distribution
of the devise if both A and B predecease the testator. Many
courts, particularly those that hold that words of survivorship
alone are sufficient to prevent the application of the statutes,
state that when both the primary and alternative devisees have
predeceased the testator, the antilapse statute should not apply
and the devise should fall into the residue.'24 By using words
of survivorship and an alternative taker, the testator has clearly
indicated contrary intent.12
A growing number of jurisdictions hold that words of survivor-
ship, when attached to alternative devises, are effective only
when there are actually survivors among the primary and alter-
native takers.'26 These courts hold that if both the primary and
alternative devisees predecease the testator, then the antilapse
statute is revived and the devise passes to the issue of the pri-
mary devisee by virtue of the antilapse statute.'27
Other Methods of Manifesting Contrary Intent
Some courts recognize other methods of manifesting contrary
intent. For example, in some jurisdictions, a residuary gift that
states "the remainder of my estate, including any lapsed devises,
I give to A" indicates the testator's intent that the statute not
124. E.g., In re Estate of Wagner, 423 So. 2d 400, 403-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); In re Estate of Hanf, 99 A.2d 673, 673-74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); In re Estate
of Hillman, 363 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
125. Roberts, supra note 8, at 348-49.
126. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ulrikson, 290 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Minn. 1980).
127. Id.; In re Estate of Allmond, 520 P.2d 1388, 1390-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974);
Estate of Kehler, 411 A.2d 748, 750 (Pa. 1980); see also Estate of Braun, 126
N.W.2d 318, 321 (Iowa 1964) (holding that devise to husband and wife and, if hus-
band and wife predecease testator, then to another individual, did not manifest an
intent contrary to antilapse statute; thus, when only husband died before testator,
his half interest passed to his children).
If the primary and alternative devisees have predeceased the testator, and only
the alternative devisee has surviving issue, then presumably the devise passes to the
issue of the alternative devisee. For the UPC's rather complicated solution to this
problem, see infra text accompanying notes 229-49.
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operate.12 This type of residuary clause presents confusion be-
cause a court may view a devise that can be saved by an anti-
lapse statute as not having lapsed; consequently, such a court
may not accept the language in the residuary clause as evidence
of an intent that the statute not apply.
A minority of jurisdictions regard the testator's scheme of
distribution, such as devises to the issue of the predeceased
devisee, as a clear manifestation of a desire that the statute not
apply. 129
As this discussion demonstrates, the "clear intent" standard
by which courts determine whether the testator would want an
antilapse statute to apply to a particular devise is ill-defined. As
a consequence, testators and scriveners do not know the legal
effect of their words. They may make a devise in a manner that
they believe adequately expresses their subjective intent when,
in fact, the courts will attach an entirely different meaning to
their language. In one state, separate courts in the same juris-
diction construed virtually identical language differently, and
neither was overturned.3 °
An antilapse statute that expressly detailed how to avoid its
operation would eliminate a significant amount of litigation by
providing courts with a reliable and consistent standard to ap-
ply.
Construction of Class Gifts131
At common law, a devise to a class of persons operates differ-
ently from a specific devise. For example, when the testator de-
vises "$10,000 to my children, share and share alike" the com-
mon law treats this language as creating a class gift and' impos-
128. Estate of Salisbury, 143 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1978).
129. Roberts, supra note 8, at 362-64. Iowa recognizes an entirely unique method of
manifesting contrary intent. See In re Everett's Estate, 28 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Iowa
1947) (providing that the doctrine of worthier title manifests an intent on the part
of the testator that the statute not apply).
130. Compare Detzel v. Nieberding, 219 N.E.2d 327, 336 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1966) with
Shalkhauser v. Beach, 233 N.E.2d 527, 530 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1968).
131. For a thorough discussion of antilapse statutes and class gifts, see W.E.




es a requirement of survivorship on the gift. 3 ' Class gifts,
however, do not lapse unless all class members predecease the
testator."' If only one of the testator's children predeceased
the testator, that child's share of the $10,000 would be divided
among the remaining class members. 3 4 Many antilapse stat-
utes expressly change this result, providing that when a class
member predeceases a testator, the class member's share passes
to that class member's issue.
135
Not all antilapse statutes expressly provide for class gifts.
16
This silence presents courts with a problem of interpretation of
the statute rather than of testamentary intent. If an interest in
a class gift fails because a class member has predeceased the
testator, technically, the gift interest does not lapse if there are
surviving members of the class. If a court applies antilapse stat-
utes only to lapsed gifts, then, in theory, the statute should not
act to save class gifts that have not lapsed because a potential
class member has not survived the testator. Conversely, if a
court views antilapse statutes as a means to reverse the harsh
common law rule of disinheriting the children of a predeceased
devisee, it should not matter whether the devise was fashioned
in the form of a class gift; the statute will be held to apply to
class gifts. 137 Most courts include class gifts in the purview of
the statute.3 However a minority of courts refuse to apply an
antilapse statute to a class gift where the statute fails to men-
tion class gifts."
9
The confusion over whether antilapse statutes, absent express
132. In other words, the class of takers ("to my children") does not open until the
testator dies. The class consists of those persons who are alive at the death of the
testator. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.9.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
136. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have antilapse statutes that do not
mention class gifts. See supra note 45.
137. See ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140.
138. Id.
139. E.g., In re Estate of Kalouse, 282 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 1979) (holding that
antilapse statute does not cover class gifts); cf In re Estate of Zagar, 491 N.W.2d
915, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that antilapse statute should only apply to
class gifts if all of the class members predecease the testator). For additional exam-
ples, see cases cited in ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140 n.30.
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language, should cover class gifts arises out of the conflict be-
tween the law of wills that treats class gifts differently from
specific devises and the policy underlying antilapse statutes.
Most states have effectively eliminated this confusion by passing
statutes that expressly apply to class gifts. 4 ' No state has a
statute that expressly excludes class gifts from antilapse protec-
tion, and the better course appears to be to extend the coverage
to include class gifts. The policy of antilapse statutes is to pro-
vide for the children of predeceased devisees where the testator
has been silent on the matter, and whether the statute applies
should not depend on ancillary issues such as the technical defi-
nition of the term "lapse." Furthermore, if a testator is presumed
to prefer that a specific gift to a predeceased child be saved for
that child's issue, it should not matter that the testator made
the gift in the form of a class gift or a devise to a specific per-
son.14' In either event, the antilapse statute should expressly
deal with class gifts.
Void Class Gifts
A much greater dispute concerns void class gifts. A void gift
occurs when a testator devises property to one who has died
before the execution of the will.' In a class gift context, a void
gift occurs when the testator devises property "to my children"
and one of the children had died prior to the execution of the
will.' The debate over whether antilapse statutes should cov-
er void class gifts centers around the fact that the situation,
from the testator's perspective, has not changed. "4 When a de-
visee dies after the execution of the will but before the testator,
the circumstances under which the testator drafted the will have
changed, and if the testator did not provide in the will for this
changed situation, the antilapse statute will operate.145 In the
case of a void class gift, no new circumstances exist that the tes-
140. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
141. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 140.
142. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.21.
143. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
144. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 22, § 50.22
145. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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tator failed to consider. If the testator had intended to provide
for the child of the class member who was dead at the time of
the making of the will he easily could have done so.
The inequity of extending antilapse protection to class gifts
but excluding void class gifts becomes apparent in situations in
which some of the members of the class die prior to the execu-
tion of the will and others die after the execution of the will but
prior to the testator.'46 For example, assume the testator has
three children, A, B, and C. A dies, survived by children, before
the testator executes a will that contains a class gift leaving
"everything to my children." If both B and C die after the execu-
tion of the will, B's children and C's children will take not only
their parent's share of the class gift, but would also split the
share that would have gone to A if A had survived. A's children
are left completely out of the will. 47
A majority of the legislatures that have considered the ques-
tion have expressly included void class gifts. Of the thirty-five
statutes that mention class gifts, twenty-three expressly provide
antilapse protection to void class gifts.'48 Four states expressly
exclude void class gifts from the operation of their antilapse
statute.' In the group of seven states whose statutes cover
class gifts but do not mention void class gifts5 ' and the fifteen
states (and the District of Columbia) whose statutes make no
146. Roberts, supra note 8, at 344-45.
147. See, e.g., Howland v. Slade, 29 N.E. 631 (Mass. 1892).
148. ALA. CODE § 43-8-224 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.240 (1985); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2605 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-605 (West 1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2313 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.603 (West 1976); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 560:2-605 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-605 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A, § 2-605 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 22 (1990); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.134 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-605 (West 1975);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-613 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2343 (1989); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:3-35 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-603 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31-42 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-05 (2-605) (1976); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-603 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-105 (1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-605 (1993); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-3 (Michie 1982); WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106
(1977).
149. See supra note 46.
150. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 5/4-11
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273 (West 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
394.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRuSTS § 4-403 (1991);
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64.1 (Michie 1991).
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mention of class gifts151 but whose courts hold that their
statutes cover class gifts, 1 2 there is a roughly even split of au-
thority. Some of these states apply their statutes to void class
gifts,153 while others do not.'54
The argument in favor of excluding void class gifts from cover-
age of antilapse statutes is much stronger when one considers
the statute's effect on such a devise. The testator, when he
makes a devise "to my children" certainly will consider only the
children alive at the time of the execution of the will. Further-
more, the testator probably will consider his grandchildren by
the deceased child. By providing antilapse protection to void
class gifts, the statute effectively adds words to the will that the
testator has likely considered and rejected. When antilapse pro-
tection extends to void class gifts, the policy underlying the
antilapse statute becomes much more similar to that of preter-
mitted heir provisions, which provide intestate shares for speci-
fied heirs not mentioned in a will. The policies underlying pre-
termitted heir statutes should be promoted through pretermitted
heir statutes and not antilapse statutes. In any event, as is the
case with class gifts generally, void class gifts should be ad-
dressed expressly in the antilapse statute in order to avoid con-
fusion and litigation.
A Closing Word on Construction Problems
In construing antilapse statutes, some courts assert that un-
certainty should be resolved in favor of application of the stat-
utes.'55 These courts believe that this notion is implicit in the
language of the statutes.55 Disregarding whether this inter-
pretation is correct, it will lead to the steady expansion of anti-
151. See supra note 45.
152. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Gianoli v. Gabaccia, 412 P.2d 439, 441 (Nev. 1966).
154. See, e.g., Slattery v. Kelsch, 734 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
155. See, e.g., Tuecke v. Tuecke, 131 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Iowa 1964); Royston v.
Watts, 842 S.W.2d 876, 879-80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Henney v. Ertl, 71 A.2d 546,
548 (N.J. Super. 1950); Detzel v. Nieberding, 219 N.E.2d 327, 331 (Ohio Prob. Ct.
1966); Estate of Burns, 100 N.W.2d 399, 402 (S.D. 1960); Estate of Niehenke, 818
P.2d 1324, 1329 (Wash. 1991); Estate of Stewart, 72 N.W.2d 334, 335-36 (Wis. 1955).
156. See, e.g., Royston, 842 S.W.2d at 879-80.
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lapse doctrine. The instances in which antilapse statutes cause
distributions contrary to testamentary intent will multiply. Tes-
tators and drafters will find it increasingly difficult to insure
that the statute will not apply to a devise.
The antilapse statutes in effect today do not compensate ade-
quately for the many situations like those presented in the cases
cited above. Consequently, different jurisdictions apply different
rules to antilapse doctrine and the result is confusion.
There is a trade-off involved in rectifying these problems. An
antilapse statute would have to be long and complicated to deal
effectively with all of the construction issues and would probably
create its own confusion. On the other hand, it would be fairly
simple to enact language that dealt conclusively with the most
frequent of these questions without making the statute overly
complex.
THE UPC ANTILAPSE STATUTE
The original draft of the UPC, completed in 1969, contained
an antilapse statute157 that is currently in force in sixteen
states.'58 This antilapse provision represents a compromise
157. The antilapse statute in the original UPC stated:
If a devisee who is a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grand-
parent of the testator is dead at the time of execution of the will, fails
to survive the testator, or is treated as if he predeceased the testator,
the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the testator by 120 hours
take in place of the deceased devisee and if they are all of the same de-
gree of kinship to the devisee they take equally, but if of unequal degree
then those of more remote degree take by representation. One who would
have been a devisee under a class gift if he had survived the testator is
treated as a devisee for the purposes of this section whether his death
occurred before or after the execution of the will.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-605 (1969).
158. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-224 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.240 (1985), Arziz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2605 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-605 (West 1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2313 (1974) (modified by changing "by representation" distribu-
tion of lapsed devise to "per stirpes" distribution); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.603 (West
1976) (modified by changing "by representation" distribution of lapsed devise to "per
stirpes" distribution); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-605 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-605
(1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-605 (1964) (modified by changing "by
representation" distribution of lapsed devise to "per stirpes" distribution); MINN.
STAT. ANIN. § 524.2-605 (West 1975); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-613 (1993); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 3B:3-35 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-05 (2-605) (1976); S.C. CODE
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among the various forms of antilapse statutes. It covers devises
to grandparents of the testator or the grandparents' lineal de-
scendants and passes the lapsed devise to the issue of the prede-
ceased devisee by representation.'59 The original UPC anti-
lapse statute also expressly covers class gifts, even where the
class member died before the execution of the will. 6 '
Because the original UPC antilapse statute is similar to so
many of the statutes in force, it is subject to many of the same
criticisms as the antilapse statutes discussed above. With an eye
toward resolving some of these criticisms, 6' the UPC drafters,
as part of their revision of Article II, promulgated section 2-603,
a new and substantially changed antilapse statute. 6 ' The
UPC's revised antilapse provision is immediately striking be-
cause of its length. Whereas antilapse statutes are typically no
longer than a short paragraph, the updated UPC dedicates over
two pages to its antilapse statute. Furthermore, two additional
sections of the UPC, sections 2-706 and 2-707, extend antilapse
protection to other forms of testamentary and nontestamentary
transfers.' 6 ' This liberal verbiage carries out the drafters' obvi-
ous intention of extending the application of antilapse protection
ANN. § 62-2-603 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (modified by including great-grandparents and
their lineal descendants in the class of devisees protected by the statute); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-605 (1993) (modified by including all heirs of the testator in the
class of devises protected by the statute); WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1977) (modified by
changing "by representation" distribution of lapsed devise to 'per stirpes" distribu-
tion).
159. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-605 (1969). Some of the states that have adopted this
provision have changed "by representation" to "per stirpes." See supra note 159.
Utah has changed the coverage of the statute to include devises to all heirs of the
testator in the class of devises protected by the statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
2-605 (1993). South Carolina has changed the coverage of the statute to include
devises to the testator's great-grandparents and the great-grandparents' lineal heirs
in the class of devisees protected by the statute. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603
(Law. Co-op. 1987).
160. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-605 (1969).
161. The UPC drafters call these criticisms "interpretive questions." Id. § 2-603
cmt. (1990).
162. For the full text of the 1990 UPC § 2-603, see infra app. B.
163. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-706 ("Life Insurance; Retirement Plan; Account With
POD Designation; Transfer-on-Death Registration; Deceased Beneficiary."); id. § 2-707
("Survivorship with Respect to Future Interests under Terms of Trust; Substitute
Takers.").
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to areas where it has never been applied before."
The UPC's antilapse statute still covers devises to the
testator's grandparents or the grandparents' descendants, but
adds devises to stepchildren'65 to this class. 66 The UPC also
extends antilapse protection to powers of appointment, life in-
surance beneficiaries, retirement plan beneficiaries, pay-on-
death (POD) account beneficiaries, and the beneficiaries of fu-
ture interests under the terms of a trust."7 If the beneficiary
of any of these testamentary and nontestamentary gifts prede-
ceases the testator/grantor, then a substitute gift is created in
the issue of the beneficiary.
68
The current UPC also makes it much more difficult for a tes-
tator169 to defeat the operation of its antilapse statute. Under
this provision, words of survivorship, by themselves, expressly
do not prevent the application of the statute.7 For example,
the devise, "to A if she survives me" is not sufficient, by itself, to
defeat the operation of the statute. 7' Rather, in order to defeat
it a testator must use language such as "to A if she survives me,
but not to her descendants if she does not.""' The statute does
allow for the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that the
164. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
165. The inclusion of stepchildren in the class of devisees is not entirely new. See,
e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-411 (West
1993).
166. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603. Under UPC § 2-603, devises to the stepchild's de-
scendants are not covered. Id. at cmt. Whereas the inclusion of stepchildren seems
strange when devises to the spouse are not included in the coverage, the official
comments to the UPC § 2-603 provide a convincing argument for the inclusion of
stepchildren. Id.
It is, at first glance, confusing to exclude the testator's wife but include step-
children. The apparent rationale is that the testator who devises property to his
stepchild would probably want to benefit that stepchild's issue; whereas a devise to
the wife does not carry the implicit intent on the part of the testator to benefit the
wife's children from a prior marriage.
167. Id. §§ 2-706, 2-707.
168. Id. Section 2-104 imposes the additional requirement that the devisee survive
the testator by 120 hours in order to be able to take the devise. Id. § 2-104.
169. Unless otherwise noted, when discussing the revised UPC the term "testator"
includes the grantor of a nontestamentary gift.
170. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(3).
171. Id. at cmt.
172. Id.
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testator intended the words of survivorship to foreclose the ap-
plication of the antilapse statute.'73
The 1990 UPC antilapse statute also reverses the generally
accepted rule that the provision of an alternative devise is suffi-
cient to stop the operation of the antilapse statute. In other
words, if a testator devises "$10,000 to A if she survives me and
if not then to B," and both A and B predecease the testator, most
courts would not apply the antilapse statute.'74 These courts
reason that the provision of an alternative devise reflects the
testator's intent that the statute not apply.'75 Under the UPC,
however, if both A and B predecease the testator and both leave
surviving issue, the antilapse statute saves the lapsed devise for
the surviving issue.
The Drafters' Rationales for the Revisions
In updating the UPC's antilapse statute, the revised UPC's
drafters had several goals in mind.'76 The drafters' stated rea-
son for the revision was to resolve "a variety of interpretive
questions that have arisen under standard antilapse statutes,
including the antilapse statute of the pre-1990 Code."'77 The
drafters also wanted to expand significantly the operation of
antilapse doctrine and institute pioneering methods of extending
antilapse protection. 7 ' The drafters claimed that this expan-
sion of antilapse protection was necessary because "an antilapse
statute is remedial in nature, tending to preserve equality of
treatment among different lines of succession."'79 Therefore,
"the remedial character of the statute means that it should be
given the widest possible latitude to operate in considering
whether in an individual case there is an indication of a con-
trary intent sufficiently convincing to defeat the statute."' In
other words, because antilapse statutes are "remedial," any
173. Id. § 2-603(b)(3).
174. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
176. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 101, at 1101-02.
177. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 cmt.
178. Ascher, supra note 18, at 650.




uncertainty as to whether the testator has manifested an intent
that the statute should not apply should be resolved in favor of
applying the statute. The drafters never fully explained why the
"remedial nature" is good (or exactly what it is) and the result of
their extension of antilapse doctrine is certain to result in appli-
cations of the antilapse statute that are clearly contrary to testa-
mentary intent.
In determining whether the 1990 revisions have improved the
UPC antilapse statute, this Note will evaluate it based on three
criteria: (1) whether the revisions have adequately addressed the
problems identified with existing antilapse statutes, (2) whether
the solutions that the UPC drafters have presented tG address
these problems are likely to create other problems, and (3) the
merits of the revisions that are directed toward expansion of
antilapse doctrine.
The Antilapse Problems and UPC Solutions
In the discussion of antilapse statutes above, this Note identi-
fied two general areas with regard to antilapse statutes that
often cause either distributions contrary to the intent of the
testator or confusion on the part of the courts as to the proper
application of the statutes. The first of these problem areas is
the inflexibility with which antilapse statutes are applied."' 1
For example, few antilapse statutes force the court to consider
who would take by virtue of the statute and who would take by
virtue of the common law rule in determining an outcome that
the typical testator would presumably prefer. 2
The UPC solution to this problem is likely to increase the
frequency of litigation. If, for example, a testator uses language
that could be interpreted to manifest an intention that the anti-
lapse statute not apply, the UPC allows the court to consider
extrinsic evidence in determining the testator's true intent.18 3
When a testator disinherits a devisee's son, and the devisee pre-
deceases the testator, the residuary takers are invited, by the
language of the statute, to institute court action to stop the son
181. See supra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
183. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(3) cmt.
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from taking the devise by virtue of the statute. Encouraging
litigation, however, may not be the most efficient method of un-
covering testamentary intent. Statutes should not be vehicles for
expanding the burden on the judiciary. The drafters would bet-
ter serve the interests of justice by simply applying a hard rule
that express disinheritance is (or is not) sufficient to defeat the
operation of the statute.
184
Construction Problems and the UPC
The general simplicity of current antilapse statutes and their
failure to compensate expressly for the numerous construction
problems that cases repeatedly present is another general prob-
lem area raised in the above discussion.8 ' The revisions of the
UPC's antilapse statute have dealt with many of these difficul-
ties. The drafters' solution in almost'86 every one of these areas
has been to expand the operation of the antilapse statute. Con-
sequently, there is less confusion over whether the statute
should apply, but in some areas, the UPC's extension of anti-
lapse protection applies in ways that are of dubious value.
Class Gifts
The failure of many antilapse statutes to deal expressly with
class gifts and void class gifts has caused conflicting results
among the states."7 The original UPC antilapse statute ex-
pressly covered both of these testamentary gifts and the newer
version has not changed this coverage.'88 In the case of class
gifts, the UPC has done nothing different from the majority of
184. Not allowing an expressly disinherited individual to take by virtue of the stat-
ute would be the preferred method. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
186. Oddly, the official comments to 2-603 include a statement that a "method of
expressing a contrary intention as to nonresiduary devises is to add to the residuary
clause the phrase 'including all lapsed or failed devises.'" UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603
cmt. See generally Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 101 (explaining the rationale of
many of the changes in the UPC's antilapse statute). This comment is noteworthy
because it is the single feature of the UPC antilapse statute that actually reduces
the frequency with which the statute will apply.
187. See supra notes 131-54 and accompanying text.
188. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603.
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other states.8 " Additionally, it makes sense to expand antilapse
doctrine to cover class gifts. 90
Similarly, many of the states whose antilapse statutes ex-
pressly cover class gifts expressly include void class gifts;19' the
drafters of the UPC have done nothing radical by including void
class gifts in the coverage of the antilapse statute. However,
extending antilapse coverage to void class gifts probably decreas-
es the likelihood that the statute will apply testamentary in-
tent.192 Nonetheless, by expressly dealing with the issue of void
gifts, the UPC has effectively reduced the amount of litigation
concerning this issue.
Testamentary Transfers Other Than Devises
As discussed above,'93 the UPC antilapse statute now covers
almost the full range of alternatives to testamentary gifts, in-
cluding beneficial interests in insurance policies, POD accounts,
retirement accounts, powers of appointment, and future inter-
ests in trusts. Only one state antilapse statute expressly covers
any of these types of transfers.'94 Occasionally, courts have in-
terpreted state antilapse statutes to cover one or more of these
transfers.9 ' With most of these transfers (specifically insur-
ance policies, POD accounts, retirement accounts, and powers of
appointment) applying antilapse protection is merely a question
of whether the typical testator would intend the descendants of
the deceased beneficiary to take the gift. Because receipt of
these testamentary gifts requires survivorship on the part of the
189. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
191. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text following note 154.
193. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
194. N.M. SWAT. ANN. § 45-2-603 (Michie 1978). New Mexico is the only state that
has adopted §§ 2-706 and 2-707 of the revised UPC.
195. See, e.g., Estate of Eddy, 176 Cal. Rptr. 598, 611 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting that
California antilapse statute applies to powers of appointment); Dewire v. Haveles,
534 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Mass. 1989) (noting that Massachusetts antilapse statute ap-
plies to gifts in trust); Dollar Savings & Trust Co. of Youngstown v. Turner, 529
N.E.2d 1261, 1262 (Ohio 1988) (holding that antilapse statute applies to trusts);
Estate of Neihenke, 818 P.2d 1324, 1327 (Wash. 1991) (holding that antilapse
statute applies to options).
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beneficiary, in exactly the same manner as the receipt of a de-
vise in a will, the argument for their inclusion under the um-
brella of antilapse protection is at least as convincing as that for
including a devise.'96 Accordingly, the UPC's express inclusion
of these gifts is laudable because it creates a hard rule that will
reduce litigation and confusion.
On the other hand, the drafters' inclusion of future interests
in inter vivos and testamentary trusts in section 2-707 may add
confusion. The common law imposes a constructional preference
for vested future interests in trusts.'97 Under this preference, if
a beneficiary of a trust predeceases the distribution date9 ' the
beneficiary's interest is considered vested, and the trust assets
go to the beneficiary's successors.'99 Generally, the beneficiary
can also assign or devise the interest in the trust. However, the
UPC imposes the opposite constructional preference such that
"[a] future interest under the terms of a trust is contingent on
the beneficiary's surviving the distribution date. '20° The UPC,
under the guise of creating an antilapse statute, has reversed a
fairly well established common law doctrine and decreed that all
future interests under a trust are contingent and not vested.
196. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 101, at 1125-26.
197. LEWIs S. SImEs & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 585 (2d.
ed. 1956); see also In re Estate of Ferry, 361 P.2d 900, 905 (Cal. 1961); Mueller v.
Forsyth, 235 N.E.2d 645, 648-49 (Ill. App. 1968); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 cmt
(1990). This preference is not absolute. Fletcher v. Hurdle, 536 S.W.2d 109, 112-13
(Ark. 1976); Schau v. Cecil, 136 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 1965); Altman v. Rider, 291
S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ky. 1956).
198. "Distribution date" refers to the time when the future interest is to take effect
in possession or enjoyment. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(a)(4).
199. The successors would be the beneficiary's heirs if the beneficiary dies intestate
or the beneficiary's residuary legatees if the beneficiary dies testate.
200. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b). Note that under § 2-701, a finding within the
trust document of an intent contrary to the operation of the rules of construction
(such as § 2-707) supersedes this constructional preference. Id. §§ 2-701, 2-707 cmt.
The comments to § 2-701 do not expressly state that extrinsic evidence is allowed to
show a contrary intent whereas, in contrast, the comments to § 2-601 (referring to
rules of construction for wills) do expressly state that extrinsic evidence is allowed.
Id. § 2-601 cmt. However, the wording of § 2-701 seems to indicate that any finding
of contrary intent (not just a finding within the governing instrument) is sufficient
to toll the operation of the statute. See id. § 2-701. Accordingly, under § 2-707, it is
possible for a grantor to indicate in his will that he does not intend for § 2-707 to
apply to a trust created by a separate instrument.
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This change has many possible implications that are generally
beyond the scope of this Note.2"' However, there are some sig-
nificant aspects of the UPC treatment of future interests in
trusts that deserve discussion.
When the beneficiary of a future interest in a trust predeceas-
es the distribution date, there are three possible solutions: (1)
the law could imply a condition of survivorship with a reversion-
ary interest in the grantor or grantor's estate,"2 (2) the law
could provide for alternative takers, or (3) the law could imply
no condition of survivorship and allow the trust interest to pass
to the deceased beneficiary's successors. UPC section 2-707
adopts part of the first solution and part of the second solution.
The statute operates by requiring the beneficiary to survive the
distribution date of the trust and creating a substitute gift in
alternative takers. The alternative takers are (1) the
beneficiary's issue, (2) the residuary takers under the terms of
the grantor's will,0 3 and (3) the grantor's heirs, respective-
ly.204 If the beneficiary of a future interest in a trust prede-
ceases the distribution date, the trust proceeds immediately pass
201. For example, when future interests are vested, it is much easier to resolve
disputes because those who may have a possible interest in the trust are much more
easily identifiable. If the future interest in a trust is contingent, under the doctrine
of virtual representation, everyone that possibly could have an interest in the trust
must be represented in any dispute concerning the trust. Under some circumstances,
these individuals might not be identifiable. For a thorough discussion of these issues,
see Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867 (1986)
(discussing the early vesting of contingent future interests in trusts and the implica-
tions of the Rule Against Perpetuities); Rochelle A. Smith, Note, Why Limit a Good
Thing? A Proposal to Apply the California Antilapse Statute to Revocable Living
Trusts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1391 (1992).
202. This solution would also include acceleration of the succeeding interest in the
trust.
203. The residuary takers under the grantor's will receive a substitute future inter-
est if the 'trust was created in a dionresiduary devise in the [grantor's] will or in a
codicil to the [grantor's] will . . ." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(d)(1).
204. In other words, if a grantor creates a trust that states, "$10,000 in trust to
Trustee to pay the income to Alan for life, remainder to Bob," § 2-707 adds the
words "and if Bob fails to survive Alan, remainder to Bob's issue; and if Bob fails to
survive Alan and dies without issue, remainder to the residuary takers under my
will; and if Bob fails to survive Alan and dies without issue and the residuary tak-
ers under my will cannot take, remainder to my heirs." See id. § 2-707.
Also note that under § 2-701, § 2-707 yields to a contrary intent expressed in
the trust document. Id. at cmt.
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to the beneficiary's issue... without passing through the
beneficiary's estate, thus saving probate costs and taxes." 6
According to the official comment, the objective of the drafters
in developing this section is to "project the antilapse idea into
the area of future interests."2 7 The statute does not cover all
future interests, however, because by its terms, section 2-707 is
limited to future interests under a trust.
20 8
Unlike all other UPC antilapse provisions, section 2-707 ap-
plies to all future interests in trusts, not just those to the
grantor's grandparents or the descendants of the grantor's
grandparents. Moreover, section 2-707 differs from other anti-
lapse statutes because the beneficiary must survive the "distri-
bution date" of the trust.2 9 Normally, antilapse statutes oper-
ate under a system that requires the beneficiary to survive the
testator. For example, if a grantor created a trust that stated
"$10,000 in trust to Trustee to pay the income to Alan for life,
remainder to Bob," under section 2-707, Bob must survive Alan
in order to take a vested interest in the $10,000. Bob's failure to
survive Alan could occur many years after the death of the
grantor. If Bob had no issue and died prior to Alan but fifty
years after the grantor, section 2-707(d)(1) states that after
Alan's death, the $10,000 should pass to the residuary takers
under the terms of the testator's will.210 However, the residu-
ary takers must also survive Alan because they are treated as
having "a future interest under the terms of the trust."21'
205. If the beneficiary died without issue, the property passes to the residuary tak-
ers under the grantor's will or to the grantor's heirs. Id. § 2-707(d).
206. Although the rationale of implying survivorship is to avoid taxation of the
trust assets as a part of the deceased beneficiary's estate, distribution to alternate
takers (who are the issue of the beneficiary) may be subject to a generation skipping
tax under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2611-12 (1986). This ques-
tion deserves further attention but is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this Note.
207. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 cmt.
208. The rationale of this distinction is that, as to legal interests, early vesting is
favored because early vesting allows for the more efficient disposal of property. With
trusts, the entire legal interest rests with the trustee who can normally dispose of
the property if efficiency so demands. See id.
209. Id. § 2-707(b).
210. Id. § 2-707(d)(1).
211. Accordingly, any time that a grantor creates a trust with a future interest,
the residuary takers under the grantor's will have a contingent interest in the trust.
306 [Vol. 36:269
UPC ANTILAPSE STATUTE
Without a more in depth discussion into the various iiplica-
tions of section 2-707,212 it is difficult to categorically state
whether the extension of antilapse doctrine to the area of future
interests is praiseworthy. The drafters' claim that the statute
would avoid the "cumbersome and costly distributions to and
through the estates of deceased beneficiaries of future inter-
ests"21 is debatable. The advantage of the statute is that trust
assets would not have to pass through a deceased beneficiary's
estate. However, the possible necessity of determining the
grantor's surviving residuary takers or heirs, long after the
death of the grantor, could be quite cumbersome.
Additionally, the doctrine of antilapse as it applies to wills
operates only at the time that the testator dies. UPC section 2-
707 can operate before or after the grantor dies. If a grantor
creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust that includes a future
interest in a beneficiary, under the common law, which treats
the future interest as vested, the beneficiary has the opportunity
to change the ultimate destination of the trust assets. For exam-
ple, suppose a grantor creates a trust that states, "$100,000 in
trust to Trustee to pay the income to Wife for life, remainder to
sons Alan and Bob share and share alike." Under the common
law, if circumstances change such that Alan has no need for his
portion of the trust assets, he can transfer his future interest to
Bob. Under section 2-707, any transfer Alan makes would be
contingent on his surviving the life beneficiary.214 Section 2-
707 does not allow the holders of a future interest in a trust to
rearrange the distribution of the trust assets to compensate for
the many potential changes that could occur in the potentially
extended period between the creation of the trust and the distri-
bution date.
If the residuary takers do not survive the distribution date, a substitute gift is also
created in their issue such that the issue would take whatever their ancestors would
have been entitled to take had they survived. Id.
212. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
213. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 cmt.
214. Furthermore, assembling all of the possible contingent beneficiaries in order to
allow such a change in the trust would be extremely difficult if not impossible. See
supra note 198.
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UPC Antilapse and a Contrary Intent
With regard to defeating the operation of the antilapse stat-
ute, the UPC has made expressing contrary intent much more
difficult in two ways. First, the UPC expressly states that words
of survivorship alone are not sufficient to defeat the operation of
the statute.215 Second, the UPC's antilapse statute operates
even when the testator provides for alternate devises.216
As was discussed above, courts generally recognize that the
inclusion of words of survivorship21 ' clearly manifests the
testator's intent that the statute not operate.218 Accordingly, by
expressly stating that words of survivorship are not sufficient to
defeat the statute, the UPC has "chosen to stand on its head an
established rule upon which those who draft wills must and
should be able safely to rely."" 9 The UPC drafters ignore the
concept that the antilapse statute is to apply to situations that
the testator has not considered.22 °
Several courts have held that mere words of survivorship are
not sufficient to defeat the operation of the statute, but these
courts are in the minority.22" ' The UPC has chosen to follow the
minority path much to the dismay of at least two commenta-
tors.222 This action on the part of the UPC drafters is com-
mendable to the extent that the statute provides a hard rule
that would produce more consistent results. However, the draft-
ers tempered their action by allowing for the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to determine whether the testator intended
for the words of survivorship to foreclose the operation of the
statute, thereby undermining the beneficial effects of the
rule. 3 Under this statute, litigation is likely to increase be-
cause every time words of survivorship appear in a will, the
residuary devisees may institute court action in an attempt to
215. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603.
216. Id.
217. E.g., when the testator devises "Blackacre to A if she survives me."
218. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
219. Ascher, supra note 18, at 652.
220. Id.
221. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 18; Begleiter, supra note 18.
223. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 cmt. (1990).
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show that the testator voiced his desire that the antilapse stat-
ute not apply to any devise.
224
This revision has also been criticized on the grounds that it
will expose attorneys to increasing malpractice liability.225 At-
torneys who rely on the generally accepted rule that words of
survivorship adequately foreclose the operation of the statute
will find themselves defending malpractice actions brought forth
by angry residuary takers.226
In this case, the drafters missed an opportunity to create a
better statute which expressly states that words of survivorship
defeat the operation of the statute.227
Alternative Devises Under the UPC
With regard to alternative devises, the UPC's antilapse stat-
ute has also overturned an accepted rule. Most courts today hold
that the provision of alternative devises has the effect of mani-
festing a clear intent contrary to the application of an antilapse
statute.228 In these states, if a testator makes a devise to the
effect of "to A if he survives me and if not, then to B" the anti-
lapse statute will not apply even if both A and B predecease the
testator. This rule has a much greater likelihood of applying
testamentary intent because the testator who has provided for
an alternative devise has obviously thought of the contingency
that a beneficiary under the will may die. Therefore, it is much
more likely that the same testator has also considered what
would happen if the alternative devisee .also dies. Following the
general rule that an alternative devise is sufficient to defeat the
operation of the statute, the testator presumes that the lapsed
devise will fall into the residuary.
224. Ascher, supra note 18, at 653-54. For further discussion of the UPC treatment
of extrinsic evidence with regard to antilapse statutes, see infra notes 258-63 and
accompanying text.
225. Begleiter, supra note 18, at 127-30.
226. Id. But see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 cmt. (rebutting this argument by stat-
ing that, in combination, §§ 2-601 and 2-603 will not expose lawyers to malpractice
liability; the finding that would be necessary to establish attorney malpractice would
also establish that the antilapse statute should not apply).
227. Ascher, supra note 18, at 650-52.
228. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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Under the UPC, a testator who wants to stop the operation of
the antilapse statute and who provides for alternative devises
must write the devise "to A if she survives me and if she does
not then to B, and if B does not survive me then not to either
11129A's or B's issue.
An Interpretive Nightmare: Subsection (c)
When the drafters of the UPC changed the accepted rule and
decreed that alternative devises would not stop the operation of
the antilapse statute, they apparently feared that this change
might cause confusion.23 ° In a situation where a testator devis-
es, "$10,000 to A if she survives me, and if not, then to B," and
both A and B predecease the testator and both leave surviving
issue, the UPC directs the courts to apply the antilapse stat-
ute."' The drafters apparently were concerned that the courts
applying the statute would not know how to apportion the
$10,000 among A's issue and B's issue. Accordingly, they created
a complicated scheme to deal with this potential problem. Under
this system, the provision of alternative devises by the testator
does not foreclose the operation of the statute even if the second-
ary devisee. 2 survives the testator and takes the entire devise.
Examples may help in explaining how and why the UPC han-
dles alternative devises in this manner, but a vivid imagination
may help even more.
When a testator devises "$10,000 to A if he survives me, and
if not, then to B," where A does not survive the testator but does
leave surviving issue and B does survive, the UPC nevertheless
creates a substitute gift in A's surviving issue even though B,
the secondary devisee, survives and takes the entire $10,000.
The secondary devise to B supersedes the substitute gift as long
as B survives the testator and the substitute gift to A's issue
amounts to nothing. If both A and B predecease the testator,
229. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-306 cmt.
230. Id.
231. Id. § 2-603 & cmt.
232. For the purposes of this discussion "secondary devisee" refers to the beneficia-
ry of the devise that takes effect if the "primary devisee" dies. For example, if a
testator devises, "$10,000 to A if she survives me, and if she does not, then to B," A
is the primary devisee and B is the secondary devisee.
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then the substitute gift to A's issue takes effect.
To extend this example even further, if a testator makes the
same devise: "$10,000 to A if he survives me, and if not then to
B," but both A and B predecease the testator and both leave
surviving issue, then a primary substitute gift is created in A's
issue and a secondary substitute gift233 is created in B's issue.
In this case, A's issue would take the entire $10,000 because the
primary substitute gift to A's issue supersedes the secondary
substitute gift to B's issue."
The reason that the UPC creates substitute gifts that seem-
ingly never have a possibility of taking effect is not so that the
antilapse statute can be called into operation to create a nullity.
This language presumably is employed so that subsection (c) of
the antilapse statute is understandable.
Subsection (c) of the UPC's antilapse statute is titled: "More
Than One Substitute Gift; Which One Takes."" This subsec-
tion is designed to deal with two situations.
The first of these situations arises when the testator devises
property to be shared by two or more named devisees (who are
in the protected class) where the testator clearly intends the
survivor(s) of the devisees to take over the issue of a prede-
ceased devisee. An example of such a devise would be "$5000 to
A and B, share and share alike, or to the survivor." In this case,
subsection (c) goes into effect when both A and B predecease the
testator.
If, in the above example, A and B both predecease the testator
and both leave surviving issue, then:
(1) a primary substitute gift of $2500 is created in the issue of
A under A's gift,
(2) a secondary substitute gift of $2500 is created in the issue
of A under B's gift,
(3) a primary substitute gift of $2500 is created in the issue of
B under B's gift, and
(4) a secondary substitute gift of $2500 is created in the issue
233. U.P.C. § 2-603 never actually uses the term "secondary substitute gift." This
term is purely a creation of the Author made in the interest of clarity.
234. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 & cmt.
235. Id. § 2-603(c).
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of B under A's gift.
Of the above substitute gifts, only the primary substitute gifts
(1 and 3) take effect, and the secondary substitute gifts are su-
perseded by the primary substitute gifts. A's issue and B's issue
each take $2500.
However, if in the same devise A and B predecease the testa-
tor but only B leaves surviving issue, then a primary substitute
gift of $2500 is created in B's issue under the gift to B and a
secondary substitute gift of $2500 is created in B's issue under
the gift to A. In this case, both the primary and secondary gifts
take effect because no other gifts supersede the secondary sub-
stitute gift. Accordingly, B's issue take $5000.
The second situation arises when the testator makes individu-
al devises to two devisees (who are in the protected class) and
for each of these devises the testator names the other devisee as
the secondary devisee. An example of such a devise would be
"$5000 to A if she survives me and if not, then to B; $10,000 to
B if he survives me and if not then to A." If both A and B prede-
cease the testator and both leave issue, then:
(1) a primary substitute gift of $5000 is created in the issue of
A under A's gift,
(2) a secondary substitute gift of $10,000 is created in the
issue of A under B's gift,
(3) a primary substitute gift of $10,000 is created in the issue
of B under B's gift, and
(4) a secondary substitute gift of $5000 is created in the issue
of B under A's gift.
Again, of the above substitute gifts, only the primary substi-
tute gifts (1 and 3) take effect, and the secondary substitute gifts
are superseded by the primary substitute gifts. A's issue take
$5000 and B's issue take $10,000.
However, if in the same devise A and B predecease the testa-
tor but only B leaves surviving issue, then a primary substitute
gift of $10,000 is created in B's issue under the gift to B and a
secondary substitute gift of $5000 is created in B's issue under
the gift to A. In this case, both the primary and secondary gifts
take effect because no other gifts supersede the secondary sub-




The above examples do not adequately demonstrate the need
for secondary substitute gifts that could never take effect. One
must read paragraph (2) of subsection (c) in order to fully under-
stand the need for secondary substitute gifts. That paragraph
states, "[ilf there is a younger-generation devise, the devised
property passes under the younger-generation substitute gift
and not under the primary substitute gift.""' In other words,
the possibility exists for a secondary substitute gift to supersede
a primary substitute gift if the devise is of a certain type.
By way of illustration, assume the testator devises "$50,000 to
my child A and if he does not survive me, then to A's two chil-
dren, X and Y." If A and X both predecease the testator and X
leaves child Z surviving, then:
(1) a secondary devise of $25,000 would be created in Y,
(2) a primary substitute gift of $25,000 would also be created
in Y under the gift to A, and
(3) a secondary substitute gift of $25,000 would be created in
Z under the gift to X.
Under these circumstances, the secondary devise of $25,000
created in Y would take effect, superseding all substitute gifts.
However, the secondary substitute gift to Z would supersede the
primary substitute gift to Y because the alternative devise to
"A's two children, X and Y' is a "younger-generation devise," and
the devise must pass under the substitute gift created under
that alternative devise. Both Y and Z would each take $25,000.
This description of subsection (c) of the UPC antilapse statute
demonstrates that the subsection is, at best, unnecessarily con-
fusing. Apparently, the drafters wanted to insure that the anti-
lapse statute would apply to as many different hypothetical de-
vise/deceased devisee combinations as possible. By doing so, the
drafters hoped to resolve the types of construction problems that
may arise as a result of the complicated nature of some of these
combinations. However, the drafters ignored the fact that com-
mon sense could resolve most of the hypothetical situations that
subsection (c) is intended to address.
236. Id. § 2-603(c)(2).
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For example, in the devise, "$10,000 to A and B, share and
share alike, or to the survivor," where A and B both predecease
the testator and both leave surviving issue, subsection (c) pro-
vides the complicated scheme outlined above in order to resolve
the question of how the $10,000 gift should be apportioned
among A's issue and B's issue. Under the original UPC antilapse
statute, which did not have this scheme, the only construction
problem a court faces is whether to apply the antilapse statute
in light of the testator's use of survivorship language."' No
court would give the devise only to A's issue or only to B's issue
if it determined that the antilapse statute applied. The court
would give $5000 to A's issue and $5000 to B's issue without
going to the trouble of creating the primary substitute devises
and secondary substitute devises that the UPC antilapse statute
contemplates.23
The only counterintuitive aspect to subsection (c) is the two
paragraphs that deal with the "younger-generation devise." '239
According to the drafters, this language is designed "to preserve
equality of treatment among different lines of succession."24 °
The scheme that creates the younger-generation devise and the
younger-generation substitute gift does meet the drafters' stated
goal,241 but not without unnecessary complexity. For example,
if a court were confronted with a situation in which a testator
made a devise of "$10,000 to my son A, and if A does not survive
me then to A's two children, B and C, equally," the alternative
devises to B and C are younger-generation devises. In order to
reach this conclusion the court would have to undertake the
following analysis.
First the court would refer to subparagraph 2-603(c)(3)(i)
which defines "primary devise" as "the devise that would have
237. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 232-34.
239. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(c)(2), (3) (1990); supra note 236 and accompa-
nying text.
240. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 cmt.
241. If a testator devises "$10,000 to my son A if he survives me and if not, then
to A's children [testator's grandchildren] B and C" and A and B both predecease the
testator and B leaves surviving child X, subsection (c) of the UPC antilapse statute
splits the devise between C and X. Without subsection (c), C would get the entire
devise and X would take nothing. See id. § 2-603(c).
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taken effect had all the deceased devisees of the alternative
devises who left surviving descendants survived the testa-
tor."2 In other words, "primary devise" refers to the devise to
A. This definition is confusing because the primary devise is
partially referred to as an alternative devise. Intuitively, the
alternative devise is the secondary devise to B and C, but 2-
603(a)(1) defines "alternative devise" as:
a devise that is expressly created by the will and, under the
terms of the will, can take effect instead of another devise on
the happening of one or more events, including survival of
the testator or failure to survive the testator, whether an event
is expressed in condition-precedent, condition-subsequent, or
any other form.243
Normally, "survival of the testator"2" refers to the fact that
the testator is alive, and "failure to survive the testator" 5 re-
fers to the fact that the devisee has predeceased the testator. In
order to understand that "alternative devise" refers to all of the
possible devises mentioned in the will (the devises to A, B, and
C in the above example) the court must discern that where 2-
603(a)(1) refers to "survival of the testator," it means the surviv-
al of the devisee and not that the testator is still alive. The court
must also understand that the statement, "failure to survive the
testator" refers to the failure of someone other than the devisee
to survive.
Once the court understands what the "primary" and "alterna-
tive" devises are, it then must proceed to the definition of "youn-
ger-generation devise" in subparagraph 2-603(c)(3)(iii):
a devise that (A) is to a descendant of a devisee of the prima-
ry devise, (B) is an alternative devise with respect to the
primary devise, (C) is a devise for which a substitute gift is
created, and (D) would have taken effect had all the deceased
devisees who left surviving descendants survived the testator
242. Id. § 2-603(c)(3)(i).
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except the deceased devisee or devisees of the primary de-
vise."'
Again, the court must determine if the secondary devises to B
and C are alternative devises "with respect to the primary
devise"247 by referring to the definition of "alternative devise."
Then the court must refer to 2-603(b)(1) to insure that the sec-
ondary devises to B and C are devises "for which a substitute
gift is created." '248 If the court refers to the official comment
section on 2-603(c)(2) for a more intelligible explanation, it will
find that the above definition of "younger-generation devise" is
repeated verbatim.
The younger-generation devise is not a thoroughly rudimenta-
ry concept, but neither is it so obscure as to require the arcane
treatment that the UPC provides. The drafters could have easily
drafted a statute that reached the same result without the un-
necessary confusion.2 49
Class Gifts and Contrary Intent
A testator who makes a class gift that states "to my children
who survive me" clearly indicates that the gift is to be divided
246. Id. § 2-603(c)(3)(iii).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. A proposal for meeting this goal in a less confusing manner would be:
(c) More than one substitute gift; which one takes.
(2) In a devise, if the testator provides for one or more secondary
devisees who are to take the devise in case the primary devisee is
treated as if he had failed to survive the testator, and the secondary
devisees are descendants of the primary devisee, and the primary devisee
does not survive the testator, then the following shall apply:
(i) If all secondary devisees survive, they shall take the portions of
the devise as provided by the will.
(ii) If at least one but fewer than all of the secondary devisees pre-
deceases the testator, and at least one of the deceased secondary devisees
leaves surviving descendants, then such surviving descendants shall take
the portion of the devise that their ancestor would have taken had that
ancestor survived the testator.
Granted, this version of the statute may not explicitly cover every possible situ-




among the children who are alive at the death of the testator.
The testator has shown that he has thought about the possibility
that one or more of his children might predecease him, and he
has provided for the alternate distribution of the devise should a
child predecease him."' Under the UPC's antilapse statute,
however, class gifts are expressly covered,251 and words of sur-
vivorship such as "to 'my surviving children,'... are not, in the
absence of additional evidence, a sufficient indication of an in-
tent contrary to the application of [the antilapse statute]."
Other Methods of Manifesting an Intent Contrary to the
Antilapse Statute
The UPC fails to mention the other recognized methods of
defeating the operation of the statute that were discussed
aboveY3 Accordingly, when courts in UPC jurisdictions are
confronted by language in a will that arguably manifests the
testator's intent that the statute not apply, several interpreta-
tions of the antilapse statute are possible.
For example, suppose a court probates a will under which an
expressly disinherited individual would take a devise by virtue
of the UPC antilapse statute. Because the UPC statute does not
expressly state whether words of disinheritance are sufficient to
toll the operation of the statute, the court would have no explicit
guidance as to whether to apply the statute. Consequently, the
court could look to a number of possible sources to determine if
the testator has clearly manifested his intent contrary to the
statute. Because the statute expressly states that words of survi-
vorship are not sufficient to toll the operation of the statute but
says nothing about express disinheritance, the court might inter-
pret the statute to include express disinheritance as a method of
defeating the operation of the statute. The court could also rea-
son that, because the statute in effect prior to the adoption of
250. See Cowgill v. Faulconer, 385 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
251. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(2).
252. Id. § 2-603(b)(3).
253. These methods are testamentary scheme, express disinheritance, disinheritance
by implication, and a devise to the descendant of the deceased devisee who would
have taken the gift under the antilapse statute. See supra notes 103-12: 128-29 and
accompanying text.
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the UPC did not mention express disinheritance, the same rule
that applied to the old statute should be applied to the UPC
antilapse statute. Additionally, the court could read the com-
ments of section 2-603 which state that
[i]n the absence of persuasive evidence of a contrary intent,
however, the antilapse statute, being remedial in nature, and
tending to preserve equality among different lines of succes-
sion, should be given the widest possible chance to operate
and should be defeated only by a finding of intention that
directly contradicts the substitute gift created by the stat-
ute.M
After reading this comment the court could hold that "the
widest possible chance to operate"255 language means that
doubt as to whether the statute applies should be resolved in
favor of applying the statute. Conversely, the court could hold
that the application of the statute "directly contradicts" 256 the
express language in the will that states that the individual is to
take no part of the estate.
Hence, depending on the jurisdiction, it will either be ex-
tremely difficult to prevent an antilapse statute from applying,
or significant confusion over defeating the operation of the UPC
statute will continue to result. In either case, the appearance of
an express disinheritance or any other recognized method of
manifesting contrary intent in a will is certain to invite in-
creased litigation because all of the methods of statutory
interpretation mentioned above are regarded as reasonable ap-
proaches. Simply put, the UPC antilapse statute does not suffi-
ciently indicate which of these methods of statutory interpreta-
tion should be applied.
The drafters, in carefully including language that stated that
words of survivorship would not toll operation of the antilapse
statute, should have taken the further step of expressly dealing
with the other methods of manifesting intent contrary to the
statute. Courts in several jurisdictions deem express disinheri-
tance to be a clear manifestation of the testator's intent that the





antilapse statute not apply.257 By not mentioning these
methods, the antilapse statute invites increased litigation.
Extrinsic Evidence and Contrary Intent
As noted above, all current antilapse statutes are rules of con-
struction that yield to a finding of contrary intent. In all but
a few of the states, the contrary intent must be found in the lan-
guage of the will itself-no evidence extrinsic to the will may be
considered in determining whether the testator clearly mani-
fested his intent that the statute not apply unless an ambiguity
exists on the face of the will.
25 9
In reversing this rule, UPC section 2-601 states "[i]n the ab:
sence of a finding of a contrary intention, the rules of construc-
tion in this Part control the construction of a will."260 In the
comment to section 2-601, the drafters state that "evidence ex-
trinsic to the will as well as the content of the will itself is ad-
missible for the purpose of rebutting the [antilapse statute] .261
Accordingly, no limits are placed on the character and manner of
the evidence presented. Under the UPC, any time a court con-
fronts a situation calling for the application of the antilapse stat-
ute, extrinsic evidence is allowed in order to show that the testa-
tor would not have intended for the statute to operate-even if
the content of the will raises no question or ambiguity as to
whether the statute should be applied.262 As a consequence,
any time a devise lapses, the residuary devisees (or the
testator's heirs if there are no residuary devisees) would have
standing to challenge the application of the antilapse statute
regardless of the language in the will. They need only allege
that they have evidence that the testator intended the devise to
fall into the residuary. As written, the UPC antilapse statute, in
effect, has created an entirely new litigation issue. Unquestion-
ably, the UPC's invitation to courts to allow extrinsic evidence
257. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
260. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-601.
261. Id. at cmt.
262. See id.
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would have the effect of dramatically increasing litigation.
Furthermore, the rationale for excluding extrinsic evidence,
that the best evidence of the testator's intent is the attested
words of his will, still exists.263 The common law developed the
high evidentiary standard of the law of wills in order to prevent
fraud and provide for the orderly distribution of a testator's es-
tate. The UPC antilapse statute will thwart both of these goals
by allowing extrinsic evidence.
CONCLUSION
Some of the revisions to the UPC's antilapse statute are note-
worthy in that they work to reduce the confusion surrounding
the current law regarding antilapse statutes. For example, the
UPC expressly extends antilapse protection to most types of
donative transfers that are to take effect on death such as insur-
ance policies. In laying down a "bright line rule" in this manner,
the drafters have effectively eliminated the confusion that courts
now face in interpreting current antilapse statutes.
The 1990 UPC antilapse statute also addresses other prob-
lems identified with current antilapse statutes, and in almost
every instance, the UPC solution has been to expand the opera-
tion of the statute. In one sense, the operation of the statute is
now much more difficult to defeat in that words of survivorship
are expressly made insufficient to overcome the presumption in
favor of the statute. The drafters apparently predicted the nega-
tive reaction that this change would provoke. Consequently, they
tempered this action by allowing completely unfettered consider-
ation of extrinsic evidence in determining whether to apply the
statute. Moreover, the UPC antilapse statute does not mention
whether it covers other traditional methods of defeating the
statute such as disinheritance of the devisee's issue. The UPC
statute's silence on these methods of manifesting contrary intent
and the allowance of extrinsic evidence are certain to increase
the amount of litigation regarding a lapsed devise.
In addition to reversing the well-established rule that words
of survivorship are sufficient to defeat the statute, the UPC ab-
263. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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rogates the rule that the provision of alternative devises is suffi-
cient to toll the operation of the antilapse statute. In making
this change, the drafters created an unnecessarily complicated
scheme for apportioning lapsed alternative devises. Firially, the
UPC reverses the common law constructional preference for
early vesting of future interests in a trust in order to extend the
antilapse policies into the area of trusts.
The UPC drafters' stated goal is to extend antilapse protec-
tion. In meeting this goal, they have created an unwieldy
statute that is confusing and certain to increase litigation.
Erich Tucker Kimbrough
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STATE DEVISEES COVERED BY STATUTE
Alabama Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
ALA. CODE § 43-8-224 (1975).
Alaska Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.240
(1985).
Arizona Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
2605 (1975).
Arkansas Child or other descendant.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104
(1987).
California Kindred to the testator or kindred to a surviving, de-
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West ceased, or former spouse.
1991).
Colorado Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-11-605 (West 1987).
Connecticut Child, stepchild, grandchild, brother, or sister.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-411 (West 1993).
Delaware Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 2313 (1974).
District of Columbia All devisees.
D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 18-308 (1981).
Florida Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
FLA. STAT. ANN.
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TREATMENT OF CLASS GIFTs WHO TAKES UNDER STATUTE
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee as by intestacy.
Includes class gifts only if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies after execution of
the will.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee per stirpes.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee per stirpes.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee in same proportions as if
it were inherited directly from their deceased
ancestor.
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STATE DEVISEES COVERED BY STATUTE
Hawaii Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 560:2-605 (1985).
Idaho Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
IDAHO CODE
§ 15-2-605 (1979).
Illinois Descendants of the testator.
ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 755, para. 5/4-11 (Smith-
Hurd 1993).
Indiana Descendants (including parents of the testator).
IND. CODE ANN.
§ 29-1-6-1 (Burns 1981).
Iowa All devisees.
IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 633.273 (West 1992).
Kansas Spouse, any relative by lineal descent, or any relative
KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. within the sixth degree.
§ 59-602 (Vernon 1983).
Kentucky All devisees.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.400
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
Louisiana No antilapse statute.
Maine Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §
2-605 (1964).
Maryland All devisees.
MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS
§ 4-403 (1991).
Massachusetts Child or other relation of the testator.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191,
§ 22 (1990).
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TREATMENT OF CLASS GIFTS WHO TAKES UNDER STATUTE
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by represehtation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee per stirpes.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee as if deceased devisee
had died intestate.
Includes class gifts. Heirs of deceased devisee.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee per capita.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts. "[Tihose persons who would have taken the prop-
erty if the legatee had died, testate or intestate,
owning the property."
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
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STATE DEVISEES COVERED BY STATUTE
Michigan Lineal descendant of grandparent.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.134 (West 1980).
Minnesota Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-605
(West 1975).
Mississippi Child or descendant.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-7
(1972).
Missouri Child, grandchild, or other relative.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.460
(Vernon 1992).
Montana Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-613
(1993).
Nebraska Related to testator in any degree.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2343
(1989).
Nevada Any child or other relation of the testator.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.200
(1993).
New Hampshire All devisees.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:12
(1974).
New Jersey Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.2"
N.J. ANN. STAT. § 3B:3-35
(West 1983).
264 Residuary devises to more than one person where one of the devisees dies and
which are not saved from lapse by the above statute go to the other takers of the residu-
ary devise. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-37 (West 1983).
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TREATMENT OF CLASS GIFTS WHO TAKES UNDER STATUTE
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue deceased devisee as by intestacy.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
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265 New Mexico is the only state to have adopted the 1990 UPC Antilapse statute.
266 Residuary devises to more than one person where one of the devisees dies and
which are not saved from lapse by the above statute go to the other takers of the residu-
ary devise. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.4 (Consol. 1979).
267 Relatives are persons related by consanguinity (blood) and not affinity (marriage).
Oliver v. Bank One, 573 N.E.2d 55 (Ohio 1991).
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STATE DEVISEES COVERED BY STATUTE
New Mexico2" Grandparent, lineal descendant of grandparent, and
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-603 stepchildren.
(Michie 1978).
New York Issue or siblings of testator.
26
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 3-3.3 (Consol. 1979).
North Carolina All devisees.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 (1993).
North Dakota Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-05
(2-605) (1976).
Ohio Relative of the testator.
267
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2107.52 (Baldwin 1992).
Oklahoma Any child or other relation of the testator.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 142
(West 1990).
Oregon Related to testator by blood or adoption.
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.395
(1990).
Pennsylvania Lineal descendants of parents of testator.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2514(9) (1975).
3291994] UPC ANTILAPSE STATUTE
STATE TREATMENT OF ANTILAPSE
268. Residuary devises to more than one person where one of the devisees dies and
which are not saved from lapse by the above statute go to the other takers of the residu-
ary devise.
269. The Pennsylvania antilapse statute operates only if testators spouse or children
would not take the property by virtue of the residue or intestacy. 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2514(9) (1975).
TREATMENT OF CLASS GIFTS WHO TAKES UNDER STATUTE
Includes class gifts even if class Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
member dies before the execution of
the will.
Includes class gifts only if deceased Wills executed prior to 9/1/92, issue of deceased
class member dies after the execu- devisee per stirpes; thereafter, issue by represen-
tion of the will. tation2
Includes class gifts even if deceased "Qualified issue--issue of deceased devisee that
class member dies before execution would take in intestacy.
of the will. If deceased class mem-
ber has no issue, remaining class
members take.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts only if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member was alive at the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.2"
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STATE DEVISEES COVERED BY STATUTE
Rhode Island All devisees.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-6-19
(1984).
South Carolina Great-grandparent and lineal descendants of great-
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603 grandparent.
(Law. Co-op. 1987).
South Dakota Any child or other relation-even if dead at execution
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29- of the will.
6-8 (1984).
Tennessee All devisees.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-105
(1984).
Texas Descendant of testator's parents.
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68
(West 1980).
Utah Heirs of the testator.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-605
(1993).
Vermont Child or other kindred of testator.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 558
(1989).
Virginia Grandparent or grandparent's descendant-even if
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64.1 dead at the execution of the will.
(Michie 1991).
Washington Child, grandchild or other relative (spouse is not a rela-
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § tive).
11.12.110 (West 1987).
West Virginia All devisees.
W. VA. CODE § 41-3-3 (Michie
1992).
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TREATMENT OF CLASS GIFTs WHO TAXES UNDER STATUTE
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee as by intestacy.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.'
No mention of class gifts. Issue of devisee per stirpes.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee.
Includes class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
No mention of class gifts. Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
270. The Tennessee Code has a separate antilapse statute for class gifts. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-3-104 (1984).
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Wisconsin Relatives of testator.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.27 (West
1991).
Wyoming Grandparent or lineal descendant of grandparent.
Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1977).
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TREATMENT OF CLASS GIFTS WHO TAKES UNDER STATUTE
Includes class gifts only if deceased Issue of deceased devisee by representation.
class member was alive at the execu-
tion of the will.
Includes class gifts even if deceased Issue of deceased devisee per stirpes.
class member dies before the execu-
tion of the will.
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APPENDIX B: 1990 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-603
(a) [Definitions.] In this section:
(1) "Alternative devise" means a devise that is expressly creat-
ed by the will and, under the terms of the will, can take effect
instead of another devise on the happening of one or more
events, including survival of the testator or failure to survive the
testator, whether an event is expressed in condition-precedent,
condition-subsequent, or any other form. A residuary clause
constitutes an alternative devise with respect to a non-residuary
devise only if the will specifically provides that, upon lapse or
failure, the non-residuary devise, or non-residuary devises in
general, pass under the residuary clause.
(2) "Class member" includes an individual who fails to survive
the testator but who would have taken under a devise in the
form of a class gift had he [or she] survived the testator.
(3) "Devise" includes an alternative devise, a devise in the
form of a class gift, and an exercise of a power of appointment.
(4) "Devisee" includes (i) a class member if the devise is in the
form of a class gift, (ii) an individual or class member who was
deceased at the time the testator executed his [or her] will as
well as an individual or class member who was then living but
who failed to survive the testator, and (iii) an appointee under a
power of appointment exercised by the testator's will.
(5) "Stepchild" means a child of the surviving, deceased, or
former spouse of the testator or of the donor of a power of ap-
pointment, and not of the testator or donor.
(6) "Surviving devisee" or "surviving descendant" means a
devisee or a descendant who neither predeceased the testator
nor is deemed to have predeceased the testator under Section 2-
702.
(7) "Testator" includes the donee of a power of appointment if
the power is exercised in the testator's will.
(b) [Substitute Gift.] If a devisee fails to survive the testator
and is a grandparent, a descendant of a grandparent, or a step-
child of either the testator or the donor of a power of appoint-
ment exercised by the testator's will, the following apply:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (4), if the devise is not in




descendants, a substitute gift is created in the devisee's surviv-
ing descendants. They take by representation the property to
which the devisee would have been entitled had the devisee
survived the testator.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (4), if the devise is in the
form of a class gift, other than a devise to "issue," "descendants,"
"heirs of the body," "heirs," "next of kin," "relatives," or "family,"
or a class described by language of similar import, a substitute
gift is created in the deceased devisee or devisee's surviving
descendants. The property to which the devisees would have
been entitled had all of them survived the testator passes to the
surviving devisees and the surviving descendants of the de-
ceased devisees. Each surviving devisee takes the share to which
he [or she] would have been entitled had the deceased devisees
survived the testator. Each deceased devisee's surviving descen-
dants who are substituted for the deceased devisee take by rep-
resentation the share to which the deceased devisee would have
been entitled had the deceased devisee survived the testator. For
the purposes of this paragraph, "deceased devisee" means a class
member who failed to survive the testator and left one or more
surviving descendants.
(3) For the purposes of Section 2-601, words of survivorship,
such as in a devise to an individual "if he survives me," or in a
devise to "my surviving children," are not, in the absence of
additional evidence, a sufficient indication of an intent contrary
to the application of this section.
(4) If the will creates an alternative devise with respect to ,a
devise for which a substitute gift is created by paragraph (1) or
(2), the substitute gift is superseded by the alternative devise
only if an expressly designated devisee of the alternative devise
is entitled to take under the will.
(5) Unless the language creating a power of appointment ex-
pressly excludes the substitution of the descendants of an ap-
pointee for the appointee, a surviving descendant of a deceased
appointee of a power of appointment can be substituted for the
appointee under this section, whether or not the descendant is
an object of the power.
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(c) [More Than One Substitute Gift; Which One Takes.] If,
under subsection (b), substitute gifts are created and not super-
seded with respect to more than one devise and the devises are
alternative devises, one to the other, the determination of which
of the substitute gifts takes effect is resolved as follows:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the devised property
passes under the primary substitute gift.
(2) If there is a younger-generation devise, the devised proper-
ty passes under the younger-generation substitute gift and not
under the primary substitute gift.
(3) In this subsection:
(i) "Primary devise" means the devise that would have taken
effect had all the deceased devisees of the alternative devises
who left surviving descendants survived the testator.
(ii) "Primary substitute gift" means the substitute gift created
with respect to the primary devise.
(iii) 'Younger-generation devise" means a devise that (A) is to
a descendant of a devisee of the primary devise, (B) is an alter-
native devise with respect to the primary devise, (C) is a devise
for which a substitute gift is created, and (D) would have taken
effect had all the deceased devisees who left surviving descen-
dants survived the testator except the deceased devisee or
devisees of the primary devise.
(iv) ' Younger-generation substitute gift" means the substitute
gift created with respect to the younger-generation devise.
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